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Financial transfers between individuals living away from their households play an important role in the 
reallocation of resources, particularly in developing countries. Likewise, the involvement of the State in 
society and public transfers of resources have been extensively documented as to their alleviation of poverty 
and inequality and long-term impacts on social welfare. Research has, however, shown a negative 
relationship between these two types of transfers.  
This paper adds to the literature by analysing this ‘crowding out’ hypothesis in a South African 
context, using the country’s relatively generous state pension program and history of migratory remittance 
transfers as its basis. I use data from the first three waves of the National Income Dynamics Study, a 
nationally-representative panel survey from South Africa. To overcome problems of endogeneity, I use 
pension age-eligibility to instrument for reported pension receipt and use a sharp regression discontinuity 
design around the pension age-eligibility threshold to see the impact of pension receipt on the level of 
remittances received. The exogeneity of pension age-eligibility is critical. I first conduct my analysis using 
cross-sectional regressions on each wave at a household level before running an analysis on pooled panel 
data at an individual level. I use various transformations of the dependent variable and a range of different 
estimators to overcome the large presence of zero observations in and non-normal distribution of the data.   
Results are robust across models and support the hypothesis that public transfers displace private 
transfers to individuals and households. This effect is less pronounced for women than for men, potentially 
due to differing household composition between genders. The policy implications for this finding are two-
fold: firstly, the state pension is reaching people is does not intend to target, reducing income to the elderly 
but potentially increasing the incomes of economic migrants; secondly, evidence of the benefits of pension 
receipt on both the elderly and the people with whom they live likely understate the true benefits per Rand 
of the program.  
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Globally, the rise of spending on state support programs has become an important feature of most 
economies. The twin goals of alleviating various types of poverty and redistributing wealth lie at 
the core of these changes, which have become a permanent feature in most developed countries. 
Those developing countries that could afford to do so have rolled out significant public transfer 
programs of their own. Accordingly, the topic of public transfers has become a central debate in 
the literature on economic and social development. Simultaneously, the past few decades have 
seen increased attention given to exchanges between and within households. More specifically, 
understanding how vulnerable groups in society distribute (often truly scarce) resources provides 
important insight into how their needs are addressed and risks are managed. This private transfer 
re-allocation of resources between individuals is seen as a vital social support mechanism, 
particularly in developing countries where other safety nets may not be as strong and where rural 
to urban migration by workers in search of economic opportunities has resulted in the need for 
channels through which resources can be transferred back home.  
Given the importance of both public and private transfers to society, it is important to 
understand the relationship between them. Investigation into this has shown evidence of inter-
relation, where changes in one affect the other. At the core of these analyses are hypotheses 
concerning the drivers of private transfers between individuals and between households. 
Understanding what motivates these transfers informs an understanding of how they may react 
with the introduction (or increase) in state support programs. Two hypotheses have been 
investigated in the greatest detail. The first is an altruism hypothesis, founded primarily on Becker’s 
(1974) theory of intra-household allocation of resources, which posits that individuals value the 
wellbeing of other members of the household in their own sense of happiness. Resources are 
transferred from one individual to another seen as being in need. The second is an exchange 
hypothesis, in which resource transfers between individuals are part of a dynamic, inter-temporal 
reciprocation of benefits. Evidence of both has been presented in the literature, with rigourous 
econometric analysis aiming to tease out the truth. Country and social context is seen as an 
important factor interpreting results found.  
South Africa provides an interesting case study for the interaction between public and 
private transfers. The country’s grant system plays an important part of the government’s socio-
economic development agenda. A long history of legalized racial discrimination and extreme 
economic inequality forms the basis of extensive social support programs which extend to many 
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vulnerable groups in society, including children, disabled people and the elderly. At the same time, 
this history of disenfranchisement and divided spatial living patterns has resulted in a labour system 
characterized by migrant workers who were forced to leave their homes in predominantly rural 
areas to seek work in cities. Remittance transfers therefore played and continue to play a role in 
supporting families. While discriminatory laws have been abolished, these patterns of work-seeking 
and monetary transfers have taken a long time to change, and only recent evidence shows a 
decrease in their importance to the welfare of the household (Posel, 2004). The significant roles 
both public and private transfers play in South African society makes understanding their 
interaction critical. How one responds to the other has important policy implications in terms of 
both targeting effectiveness and developmental impact. This paper aims to test this relationship. 
More specifically, it looks at changes in remittances received by households and individuals in 
response to the receipt of the state pension. Given that resource transfers within households are 
likely strongly influenced by individual decisions taken in the population, the pension provides a 
useful econometric tool to use given its near universal access.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section I provide an overview of the 
crowding out hypothesis being tested, with an emphasis on the drivers of resource allocation 
between and within households. I present a review of the literature related first to determining 
what these drivers are and then to evidence of crowding out that has been found. An extension of 
Becker’s (1974) theory is presented which models the utility inter-dependence between members 
of the household. This forms the theoretical framework for the hypothesis I test. Following this, 
I present an overview of the South African context, focusing first on the state pension program 
and then detailing the background to remittance transfers in society. Having explored the 
international and local literature on the topic, and provided background to the population from 
which data will be drawn, I present the methodological approach to my analysis. This is followed 
by a description of the data that I use and a presentation of results. Finally, I end with a discussion 
on my findings and conclude the paper. 
The data I use in my analysis is drawn from a nationally representative panel survey in 
South Africa that has thus far collected information over three waves. I employ a number of 
strategies to test the hypothesis of crowding out. I run a series of regressions on cross-sectional 
data from each of the separate waves, testing at a household level the relationship between 
remittance and pension receipt. I run these regressions using first OLS and then a negative 
binomial regression model. The latter to account for both the presence of large number of zero 
observations in the dependent variable and its apparent non-normal distribution. Age-eligibility is 
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used as an instrument for reported pension receipt, due to concerns over endogeneity in the latter. 
I then shift my focus to a balanced panel of pooled individual observations across the waves. I run 
OLS and Tobit regressions testing the response of remittances received to the receipt of the 
pension, again using age-eligibility to instrument for reported pension receipt. I use untransformed 
and then transformed data in an attempt to deal with the same concerns around zero observations 
and non-normal distribution. I then use a Hurdle Model to explore the difference between 
selection into positive remittance receipt and then the amount received. Finally, I present a number 
of robustness checks for various changes in the household that the literature suggest may stem 
from new pension receipt and which may simultaneously impact the level of remittances received. 




SECTION I: THEORY AND REVIEW 
 
2. UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE TRANSFERS WITHIN 
‘STRETCHED’ HOUSEHOLDS 
2.1 A Basic Model of Utility Inter-Dependence 
Private income transfers are an important component of most modern day economies. Research 
over the past few decades has shown that this is the case in both developed and developing 
countries, playing an important role in the transfer of wealth amongst individuals and households. 
Further, private transfers, or remittances, may comprise a large proportion of recipients’ incomes 
and may be crucial to ensuring the survival of very poor households (Cox, et al., 1997). Much of 
the literature and empirical research investigating transfers within the household take the theories 
developed by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) as their starting point. To understand the drivers of 
private transfers between individuals and households, it is useful to assess their presence through 
a lens of utility maximisation theory. In particular, understanding how different individuals or 
household members might factor in the utility of other members of the household provides an 
important basis for understanding the reasons why resource transfers occur. Becker (1974) was 
one of the first to postulate a model that incorporated this theory of utility interdependence. His 
work in this regard has become core to modern analysis of altruism. In their respective analyses of 
the subject, Jensen (2003) and Cox et al. (1997) articulate a basic form of Becker’s theory, 
presenting a model of utility interdependence that lends itself to understanding why private 
transfers between households might occur. The simplified model looks at a household consisting 
of a parent, p, and a child, c, over two periods. Preferences for both the parent and child are 
characterised by utility interdependence, written as follows:  
𝑈𝑖(𝐶𝑖, 𝐶−𝑖) = 𝑈𝑖[𝑉𝑖(𝐶𝑖), 𝑉−𝑖(𝐶−𝑖)], 𝑖 = {𝑐, 𝑝}   (1) 
where 𝑈𝑖 are utilities, 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑉−𝑖 are own and others’ utility and subutility functions 
(assumed here to be increasing and concave in their compositions), and 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶−𝑖 are 
consumption functions. Put simply, interdependence implies that the utility of one individual is 
dependent, even if only partly, on the utility of the other. Altruism is mutual, such that the utility 
of the parent and child, respectively, at a particular moment in time is 
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𝑈𝑝 = 𝑈𝑝[𝑉𝑝(𝐶𝑝), 𝑉𝑐(𝐶𝑐)]     (2) 
𝑈𝑐 = 𝑈𝑐[𝑉𝑐(𝐶𝑐), 𝑉𝑝(𝐶𝑝)] 
where of the parent’s well-being depends on both its own consumption and the 
consumption of the child, and vice versa. Further, consumption for both the parent and child can 
be described in terms of the budget available to each, as represented by 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖, 𝑖 = {𝑐, 𝑝}     (3) 
where 𝑇𝑖 is net transfers given by person i (transfers received minus transfers made) and 
𝑌𝑖 represents pre-transfer income. Each person’s consumption includes both their own income 
and a net transfer from the other. As a caveat, for simplicity’s sake it is assumed that capital markets 
are imperfect in the model; that is, resources cannot be transferred from the future to the present, 
or vice versa. Parents cannot save for retirement and young children cannot borrow against their 
future income. Both of these are reasonable assumptions in an environment with low employment 
prospects, low incomes and, hence, low potential for saving for the future. Consequently, there is 
also no asset accumulation or borrowing in the model (Cox, et al., 2004). In the situation described, 
we must understand what it is that prevents either the parent of the child from suffering when 
their income is very low. The answer lies in the utility interdependence aspect of the relationship 
between parent and child, which leads to income sharing in the household. To make this clearer, 
Stark (1993) proposes this case of utility interdependence stated using altruism parameters, 
(𝛼𝑝, 𝛼𝑐) such that: 
𝑈𝑝(𝐶𝑝, 𝐶𝑐) = (1 −∝𝑝)𝑉𝑝(𝐶𝑝) +∝𝑝 𝑉𝑐(𝐶𝑐)     (4) 
𝑈𝑐(𝐶𝑐, 𝐶𝑝) = (1 −∝𝑐)𝑉𝑐(𝐶𝑐) +∝𝑐 𝑉𝑝(𝐶𝑝)    
The utility of each party is affected by its own consumption as well as the weighting it 
applies to the utility of the other. The greater the emphasis placed on the other’s well-being, the 
stronger the effect of transfers to that party. In a single period situation, where the child transfers 
resources to the parent, the consumption functions for the parent and child can be written as  
𝐶𝑝 = 𝑌𝑝 + 𝑇       (5) 
𝐶𝑐 = 𝑌𝑐 − 𝑇  
After inserting these equations into the utility functions in line (4), the first order condition 








′(𝐶𝑐)    (6) 
As per Jensen (2003), the utility of the decision maker is therefore maximized when the 
weighted marginal utilities of the two parties are equal. If the pre-transfer income of the parent 
and child are unlikely to correspond with this optimum level, transfers between them are the means 
by which they equate their marginal utilities. It is important to note that this model holds for the 
situation where the parent and child co-reside as well as where they do not; transfers can therefore 
be understood to occur both within and between households. Likewise, the model can be extended 
to include multiple household members and can incorporate inter-temporal concerns around time.  
2.2 Alternative Motives for Private Transfers between Households 
The model outlined above represents a theory of utility interdependence in which household 
members are ‘caring’, in that each receives some utility from the wellbeing of the other. Models of 
social interactions like this represent an understanding of private transfers based on altruism, or 
altruistic motives. Understanding the motives driving this model are not hard to imagine: it is 
natural to assume that parents’ care for their child will extend to looking after them when they are 
young and unable to provide for themselves. Likewise, children looking after their parents when 
the latter are old and unable to work also appears normal. While evidence suggests that altruism 
may indeed be present in individuals’ interactions with one another, other reasons may be driving 
private transfers between individuals and within households.  
A number of alterative motives for private transfers have been proposed in the literature. 
If children are provided with resources by parents as an insurance mechanism to ensure care in 
old age, then it could be that transfers form an informal risk sharing arrangement between the 
parent and child. Conversely, at a later stage in life, transfers from children to parents may form 
part of the work required by the former to earn inheritance from the latter. In both cases altruism 
may not be the primary motive driving these transfers, rather than individuals acting in their own 
self-interest. More abstract, but no less plausible, is the idea that the very act of giving by either 
the parent or the child provides utility because of social norms that require such acts to occur. In 
communities where strong social bonds exist, this can be a key factor driving transfers between 
individuals and their immediate family, more distant family and friends.  
Empirical work relating to these alternative motives for private transfers has resulted in a 
variety of findings. Perhaps the most explored alternative motive for private transfers in the 
literature, and encompassing some of the theories postulated above, is the idea that these resource 
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transfers are part of an exchange for services. In this ‘exchange’ motivated model, parents make 
transfers to children in return for services received from them. In some earlier work, Cox (1987) 
examines the US economy and looks for evidence of both altruistic and exchange-based motives 
for private transfers. He finds little support for the former and more consistency with exchange-
based models of private transfers. These findings were supported by later work (Cox, et al., 1997) 
in Peru which again found consistency in exchange-based rather than altruistic models of private 
transfers. In both cases, the empirical strategy looks at transfer amounts received by households 
relative to their pre-transfer income. Results tend to show that, conditional on receiving transfers, 
the relationship between transfers and income is generally non-monotonic, being positive at low 
levels of income and negative at larger levels. This finding is consistent with the exchange-based 
hypothesis where the transfer is provided in exchange for some service. Increases in the income 
of the transfer recipient is likely to increase the implicit price of the recipient’s ‘services’ (Albarran 
& Attanasio, 2002).  
A number of subsequent studies, however, point in the opposite direction. Cox et al. (2004) 
focus on the Philippines and find altruistic preferences driving transfers between households. The 
authors also find evidence of effective risk sharing, where private transfers are used to compensate 
for the risk of shortfalls in household resources. McGarry (1999), in assessing data on transfers 
from parents to children in the US, finds that private transfers go disproportionately to less well-
off children and that differences in the level of transfers arise from differences in levels of income. 
Kazainga (2006) adds further evidence from a developing country context, Burkina Faso, a country 
with low levels of income and a tradition of gift exchange. Results suggest that the altruistic 
hypothesis holds for middle income households but not at a low income level. This implies that 
crowding out from public transfers targeting poor households is therefore likely to be minimal for 
low income households. Risk sharing was also found to be irrelevant to transfer received.  
While the empirical work mentioned above provides only a selection of the work that has 
been conducted in this area, it nonetheless provides a good overview of the variation in results 
that have been obtained and the difficulty in establishing a single coherent hypothesis for what 
drives private transfers between households. Importantly, this reinforces the need for a broader 
understanding of the societies in which public and private transfers are occurring. Those countries 
where family support structures are relied upon, for example, may lean more towards altruistic 
preferences than those where state support mechanisms are larger and already institutionalized. In 
the latter, private transfers may not be as widespread or as large a fraction of income as in the 
former, which are likely to be developing countries with smaller systems of public redistribution 
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(Cox, et al., 2004). Country context and alternative motives for private transfers between 
households can thus imply very different outcomes for public policies that redistribute income. 
2.3 A Crowding Out Hypothesis 
In a paper theorizing the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on the net wealth of society,  
Barro (1974) develops a model of social interactions similar to that in the altruistic model described 
above, one based on shared utility and overlapping generations. However, the author builds on 
this theory, by introducing the concept of intergenerational altruism that goes beyond finite lives 
and assuming that households behave like infinitely-lived dynasties (Jensen, 2003). This has 
important implications on understanding how different types of transfers affect household 
behaviour. Thus far, the concern had been exclusively on private transfers between individuals 
and/or households. Barro’s theory paved the way in understanding how the presence of public 
transfers in society – the transfer of resources from governments to citizens – might affect how 
private transfers take place. Government transfers that change how the distribution of resources 
takes place across generations, such as social security programs, may reverse private transfers 
within families (Jensen, 2003).  
In relatively recent times, the concept of a state playing an active role in the welfare of its 
people has emerged. In particular, between 1960 and 1985 the proportion of GDP dedicated to 
social expenditures in the developed world increased as welfare programs expanded; in Europe 
this ratio doubled and for other OECD countries this grew by as much as 40-50% (Congleton & 
Bose, 2010). In developing countries, many of which emerged from colonial rule during the latter 
half of the 20th century, the use of subsidies and cash transfer programs also began to increase in 
importance. The effectiveness of state programs became a topic of great interest, particularly in 
relation to cash transfers to the most vulnerable sections of society. Research was dedicated to 
assessing the effects of these programs on a range of factors, including on children’s socio-
economic outcomes, the empowerment of women and the improvement of the condition of the 
elderly. At the same time, concerns around the prospect of “crowding out” surfaced; that is, where 
income increases from state sources displace other income streams to the household. Taking the 
model described by equations (2) and (3) further, Cox et al. (1997) describe a two period model in 
which the parent and child overlap for both periods1. As with line (3), the model configuration for 
pre-transfer income can be described as 
                                                     
1 While the same reasoning that follows can be extended to multiple periods, a two-period situation is used for 
descriptive purposes here 
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Period 1:  𝑌𝑐1: low  𝑌𝑐2: high    (7) 
Period 2:  𝑌𝑝1: high  𝑌𝑝2: low 
where 𝑌 again denotes income and different periods are denoted by the numerals 1 and 2, 
respectively. As a simple example, the first period scenario describes a situation in which the child 
is too young to provide for themselves and is taken care of by parents. Conversely, in the second 
period, the parent is now too old to provide for themselves, and must be looked after by the child. 
A reasonable assumption to make is that the parent transfers resources to the child in the first 
period and the child then makes transfers to the parent in the second2. Transfers motivated 
through altruism would get around the issue of an imperfect capital market. An important feature 
of the model is that an increase in the recipient’s pre-transfer income is always met with a decrease 
in the amount of transfers received. From line (3), it can be seen that  
𝜕𝑇𝑐
𝜕𝑌𝑐1
< 0     (8) 
𝜕𝑇𝑝
𝜕𝑌𝑝2
< 0  
Consider the first period, when child income is low and parent income is (relatively) high. 
In this case, the altruistic parent will transfer income to the child. Given the model, as well common 
sense, it can be seen that children with higher income (𝑌𝑐1) require smaller transfers (𝑇𝑐) to reach 






     (9) 
On the right hand side of line (9), the first term (constant) implies that a Rand increase in 
𝑌𝑐1 is met with an identical Rand decrease in 𝑇𝑐, if first period total family income (𝑌𝑐1 + 𝑌𝑝1) is 
held constant. Importantly, though, since an increase in 𝑌𝑐1 also raises total family income (and 
which is therefore not constant), the reduction in 𝑇𝑐 will be less than Rand-for-Rand provided the 
income elasticity for parental giving is positive, which is likely to be the case (Cox, et al., 1997). 
The findings from the model and its derivations are important for two reasons. First, they indicate 
that, in circumstances where giving between parents and children are based on altruistic motives, 
exogenous increases in income to one party are offset by a reduction in transfers from the other. 
Second, the magnitude of line (9) can be quite large or quite small; that is, the responding change 
                                                     
2 Note, transfers here refer to net transfers by each party 
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in transfers to exogenous increases in income is not known in theory. Cox et al. (1997) provide 
the example of a model with Cobb-Douglas preferences and equal weighting of parent and child 
utility, which would imply that a Rand increase in 𝑌𝑐1 prompts a fifty-cent reduction in 𝑇𝑐. The 
same understanding of the model above would apply to second-period transfers, in which the 
outcome would be the same, but with the roles of the child and parent reversed.  
2.4 Empirical Testing of Crowding Out 
Research into the changes experienced in private transfers to the household in the face of public 
grant receipt have been explored in a number of developed and developing country contexts. The 
purpose of this section is less a summary of work that has been undertaken rather than a more 
detailed look at specific pieces of analysis that hold useful lessons for understanding the underlying 
drivers of crowding out in households. Cox & Jakubson (1993) investigate the effectiveness of 
public transfers on alleviating poverty while taking private transfers into account. While altruistic 
motives imply that public transfers to the household are effectively neutralized by corresponding 
reductions in private remittances received, the authors find more complex empirical outcomes 
using data from the USA. Their empirical findings suggest that, rather than supplanting them, the 
effects of public transfers can actually be magnified by private responses when seen in the context 
of exchange-based motives. The authors calculate poverty rates that subtract social transfers from 
total income to understand the extent of income poverty in the absence of grants. More 
specifically, their question revolves around whether private households would step in should public 
assistance programs be removed. If so, then private safety nets would render public transfers 
redundant, and vice versa. Using official poverty cutoff rates, which vary by age and a range of 
factors, the authors generate a private-transfer-counterfactual poverty rate (Cox & Jakubson, 1995) 
that removes from total income public transfers and calculates and adds in private transfers 
induced by their removal. The authors compare this rate with a no-response counterfactual, which 
simply subtracts public transfers from total income. A significant difference between the two rates 
would suggest some form of altruistic safety net that compensates for reductions in public cash 
transfers received. The results are small and insignificant, with no evidence of this safety net found. 
This supports the hypothesis that public cash transfers have strong redistributive effects which are 
not negated by private household action. Further, certain findings in the paper suggest that private 
behavioural responses might actually reinforce the distributional effects of public transfer 
programs due to intra-household exchange considerations. These findings are important in that 
they have implications for public policy. Firstly, studies which implicitly assume no private transfer 
response when assessing the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs are likely to be reasonably 
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accurate. Little or no crowding out means poverty rates are not biased due to changes in private 
transfers to households. Secondly, with the effects of altruistic and exchange-based motives 
working in the opposite direction, the effects of public transfers can be either reinforced or 
diminished. Knowing which motives are at play is therefore vital in understanding the broader 
effects of spending on social programs. 
As with studies looking at motives for private transfers, understanding the crowding out 
effect in developing – rather than developed – country contexts is also important. Albarran & 
Attanasio (2002) use data from the evaluation of the well-known PROGRESA program in Mexico 
to show the degree to which an intervention such as this displaces private transfers to households. 
Social programs targeted to the poor often fail to fully consider the interaction of their 
interventions on existing household arrangements. This has implications in understanding both 
the best use of scarce resources and in the long term effects on social interactions these 
interventions may have. A challenge empirically testing for these effects is that recipients of these 
programs tend not to be a random sample of the population; by the nature of their design, they 
either target resources to the most vulnerable sections of the population or are driven by political 
pressures that refuse exclusion of any deserving groups. Comparing recipients and non-recipients 
can therefore be difficult given the likely presence of unseen influences that cause the two groups 
to fundamentally differ from one another. It becomes difficult to determine what the level of 
private transfers given and received by households would have been in the absence of public 
intervention. The authors attempt to address these issues using the randomisation that was an 
inherent part of the PROGRESA design. The rollout of PROGRESA was conducted first on a 
selected group of villages with the explicit purpose of properly assessing the program’s impact 
over a period of time. A set of villages was therefore randomly excluded from the program which 
allowed for the direct evaluation of the effect of the program on parameters of interest. In this 
case, it introduced exogenous variation among different sample groups, allowing for the 
identification of the effect of the intervention on private transfers in monitored households.  
The program had three components; health, nutrition and education. Simply, along with a 
range of in-kind programs, beneficiary households received cash grants conditional on a range of 
outcomes, including visits to health centres and attendance at school. The program represented a 
considerable support for beneficiary households, with an average grant amount totaling around 
21% of beneficiaries’ income, but with the potential to reach up to approximately 60% of average 
household income for the poorest households (Albarran & Attanasio, 2002). While PROGRESA 
is therefore not a pure transfer program as subsidies depend on actions taken by recipients (the 
16 
 
conditionality resulting in a potential selection bias amongst observed households), the program 
was nonetheless seen as having an overall positive income effect on recipient households. In 
assessing private transfers, the authors find that treatment villages receive lower transfers than 
control villages. Further, within treatment villages, due to delays a number of households did not 
become beneficiaries and continued to experience relatively higher remittance transfers than those 
that did. Overall, the authors find that both the likelihood of receiving private transfers and the 
amount received conditional on receiving are significantly negatively affected by the program.  
Cox et al. (2004) find strong effects of crowding out in the Philippines, with results 
consistent with altruistic preferences, risk sharing, or both. The authors find that attempts to help 
the poor might be undone by private responses, which benefit richer households in particular who 
no longer have to support poorer family members. Using data from Germany, Reil-Heid (2006) 
finds a negative correlation between private transfers received by individuals who receive financial 
support and public transfers they receive. While the evidence on crowding out appears mixed, 
there are good indications that displacement of private by public transfers does indeed occur, and 
is more likely to happen in developing countries and to poorer households. Country context 
appears to play an important role in understanding if and why crowding out of private by public 
transfers may occur.  
3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
South Africa, one of the largest economies on the African continent, provides an interesting 
subject for an analysis of the crowding out hypothesis for two reasons: firstly, due to the country’s 
large social grant system; and secondly to its entrenched system of migratory labour. This section 
looks at each of these factors in closer detail and explores work on transfer displacement that has 
been done in South Africa.  
3.1 The South African Older Persons Grant 
A large component of the social welfare system in South African includes unconditional cash 
transfers aimed at the elderly, at children, at orphans and at people with disabilities. According to 
2015 Budget Review presented by the National Treasury (2015), it is expected that by 2017/2018 
up to 17.5 million beneficiaries will be receiving social grants. Evidence conducted as to their 
effectiveness suggests that this public spending has had a large impact on poverty reduction in 
South Africa, with the benefits accruing disproportionately to the poor; the poorest quintile’s share 
of total income made up of grants stands at around two-thirds of total household income 
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(Leibbrandt, et al., 2010). Cash grants are therefore an important government policy tool in the 
country and issues surrounding the use of grants as a measure of alleviating income poverty and 
inequality are fraught with political difficulty. While criticism around the sustainability of 
maintaining such a large public transfer program is noted, it is not the focus of this paper here. 
The relevance of social grant effects on household socio-economic outcomes is, however, central 
to this paper; given that many studies assessing their impact tend to ignore the potential for 
crowding out of remittances received.  
The South African Older Persons Grant (OPG) (formerly known as the Old Age Pension) 
is a non-contributory cash transfer from the government to elderly men and women in South 
Africa. The history of the pension reveals much about South Africa’s fractured history. Introduced 
in the 1920s as a safety net for poorer, elderly white people not covered by pensions through 
employment, transfers were only extended to non-white people in the 1940s and 1950s (Jensen, 
2003). Benefit levels for the latter were extremely low and far below those of white beneficiaries. 
It was only in the late 1980s, that a pressured government commitment to racial equality in the 
pension raised the amounts paid to non-whites until they equaled those received by whites. Since 
the early 1990’s payment has not discriminated on race. Until 2008, women and men over the age 
of 60 and 65 respectively were eligible for its receipt. Since then, gender discrimination was phased 
out and age-eligibility was equalised, such that both men and women over the age of 60 are now 
eligible for its receipt. Eligibility is subject to a means test based on the income and assets of the 
recipient but, given the high proportion of poorer households in the non-white population, means 
testing is not seen as being particularly effective and is rarely enforced (Case & Deaton, 1998). The 
current maximum amount receivable of R1,4103 represents approximately twice the per capita 
median monthly income for Africans (Ardington, et al., 2013). The transfer is available to 
individuals regardless of their labour market participation or other endogenous factors, thus 
removing the incentive for households to rearrange their composition to take advantage of the 
extra income (Hamoudi & Thomas, 2006). The OPG is therefore a very generous form of social 
assistance and one that has been shown to play an important role in poverty alleviation. 
Case & Deaton (1998) present initial evidence of the impact of the OPG on households. 
Data drawn from a nationally representative survey conducted in 1993 is examined to understand 
the effect of pension receipt on the outcomes of the elderly. Then, as now, the pension was a 
relatively large cash sum paid to all South Africans above a certain age and irrespective of previous 
contributions. Given the rapid increase in the size of the pension during the previous decade as 
                                                     
3 With an additional R20 per month for individuals aged over 75 
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the apartheid regime collapsed, it was reasonable to assume that most African recipients at the 
time had little expectation that a pension of this level would be available during their occupational 
lifetime (Case & Deaton, 1998). The unanticipated and large nature of the scheme therefore 
provided a good opportunity for analysis, which showed that the pension had significant impact 
on household welfare and was effective in reaching poor households. Benefits were seen to extend 
to both the elderly and co-resident children. These findings are part of a larger body of evidence 
which suggests that spending on cash transfers has had a significant impact on improving socio-
economic outcomes and reducing the effects of income-poverty in South Africa. Findings further 
indicate that income poor households share these benefits disproportionately, given that a far 
larger share of total household income is derived from social grants. This is particularly important 
given that many poorer households in South Africa are already operating close to established 
poverty lines. For example, much of the literature has focused on the positive impact of cash grant 
receipt on children within the household, resulting in better anthropometric health measures, 
increased likelihood of school enrolment and school attendance, higher levels of educational 
attainment, reductions in child labour, and increased resilience against parental death (Duflo, 2000; 
Edmonds, 2006; Case, 2001; Case & Ardington, 2004; Hamoudi & Thomas, 2006; Aguero et al., 
2006; Budlender & Woolard, 2006).  
Duflo (2000) examines the impact of the OPG on measures of child health and nutritional 
upbringing. Her analysis uses the expansion of the pension system that took place during South 
Africa’s transition to democracy as an exogenous identifying assumption. Controlling for the 
gender of the pension age-eligible recipient, the author compares children in poorer homes which 
contain a pension-eligible person with households that do not and finds that the presence of 
woman eligible for the OPG improves the health scores of girls, but not boys. The presence of a 
pension-eligible man in the household is not seen to have an effect on either boys’ or girls’ health 
outcomes. Case (2001) looks at a small sample of households in the Langeberg District in the 
Western Cape, South Africa to understand the trickle-down effect within households of the OPG. 
The analysis finds that when extra income from the OPG is pooled in households, children were 
seen to be significantly taller due both to improved nutritional status and to improved sanitation 
facilities within the household. Given that the majority of households pooled the income received 
through the OPG, the impact of the additional income on the community is significant. Case & 
Ardington (2004) assess the effect receiving the OPG has on softening the negative impacts on 
child educational outcomes as a result of maternal death. The results from the analysis indicate 
that the presence of a pension-eligible female in poorer households mitigates against reductions in 
enrolment and grade-progression (although not in income spent on schooling) seen for those 
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maternal orphans that do not co-reside with a pension-eligible female. Male pension eligibility, 
however, is associated with the opposite: a negative effect on grade progression and no significant 
impact on enrolment and school-related expenses. Edmonds (2006) employs a regression 
discontinuity design to identify changes in children’s schooling and child labour due to receipt of 
the OPG. His analysis finds that households that become pension age-eligible (that is, a member 
of the household becomes age-eligible to receive the OPG) are associated with lower levels of 
child labour, increases in school attendance and improvements in educational attainment, relative 
to similar households not eligible for pension receipt. These effects, though, are limited to pension-
eligible men, not women, and outcomes are seen to be larger for boys than for girls. 
3.2 Economic Migrants and Remittances in South Africa 
Apartheid-era spatial planning in South Africa resulted in the uprooting of large sections of the 
population and the forced relocation of many to remote designated areas in the country. While the 
purported purpose of this policy was the segregation of racial groups, at its core was continuation 
of the indentured labour system that had arisen with the discovery of precious metals in the 
preceding century. Areas for non-white population groups were away from core economic centres, 
with the result that workers were forced to leave their homes and travel to find work, primarily in 
urban areas and industrial zones. South Africa’s apartheid-era planning system therefore created a 
geographical disconnect between non-white workers and their places of employment. Segregation 
laws meant both the forced relocation of non-white individuals away from urban areas and 
restrictions that prevented these workers from migrating with their families. Further, in these urban 
areas, non-white individuals were required to live in townships at the edge of towns and cities, far 
away from urban centres, further reinforcing the disconnect between where people lived and where 
they worked (Hendler, 2015). The result was a system of migratory labour, where workers would 
retain a permanent home base, often in more rural areas, to which they would temporarily return 
after spending the majority of their time working in far-away urban and industrial hubs.4 While 
this “circular, or oscillating migration” (Posel, 2010) labour system had existed prior to the 
introduction of the Group Areas Act of 19505, the institutionalisation of race-based segregation 
policies during the apartheid-era consolidated the migratory labour system in South Africa and 
                                                     
4 Those responsible for earning in households – and forced to migrate to find work – are primarily men, with women, 
children and the elderly remaining at home. While this point is important, this gender dynamic is not central to the 
theme of this paper and is not discussed further.  
5 The Group Areas Act was the title for three acts of parliament enacted under the apartheid government in South 
Africa. While it was first promulgated in 1950, it was implemented over several years during which it was amended a 
number of times, repealed and re-enacted. Along with a number of other discriminatory laws, it was repealed on 30 
June 1991 by the new democratic Measures Act (1991). 
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entrenched structural inequality in many ways. It made it virtually impossible for poorer 
households to earn enough to escape poverty and removed conditions in and around the 
household conducive to overcoming inter-generational transfers of poverty and dependence. 
While the country’s new democratic dispensation has removed this race-based legislation the 
migratory labour system in South Africa largely persists to this day (Posel, 2004).  
Migratory labour systems often develop in parallel with those facilitating remittances from 
workers to distant households. To support their families, migratory labourers send resources 
(usually in monetary form) back to their homes far away. Remittances from workers to their homes 
therefore provided strong, and sometimes the only, support mechanisms for families. 
Discriminatory legislation in South Africa therefore institutionalised an occurrence that is often 
found in low-income countries, where most remittances to households originate from economic 
migrants working away from home. Todaro (1969) and Harris & Todaro (1970) present a utility 
migration model in which household members migrate if, after taking into account migration costs 
and other utility inputs, their expected utility from migrating is greater than the expected utility 
from remaining at home. Take, for example, a household composed of a parent and child where 
the latter is able to migrate to work. If the child chooses to migrate due to expected higher utility 
elsewhere, then higher incomes at home could lead to a reduced need to migrate. This would be 
the case if the well-being of the parent or the benefits from co-residing with her/him were a factor 
in the child’s utility function. While this example focuses on reduced migration by children through 
improvements in their parents living situation, the same reasoning and logic could see reductions 
in remittances rather than reductions in migration, given slight adaptations of the model.6 The 
same model can also be extended beyond the parent-child relationship, looking at cases where one 
partner in the household (husband or wife), who is the breadwinner, migrates to earn income 
elsewhere. Posel (2001) finds, for example, that while recipients can vary from being parents, 
children and spouses, the most frequent and significant remittances go more to spouses than other 
identified recipients. The utility taken into account at home can also be broadened to include a 
larger family grouping and a wider range of social norms and factors. In a society such as South 
Africa, in which strong cultural norms exist that put the onus on the household head to provide 
and care for her/his immediate and extended family, these social factors may play a large role in 
driving migration and remittance flows. These social norms can be strong enough to determine 
                                                     
6 For example, costs of returning home might be prohibitive or the utility value of remaining in a higher income area 
might still be higher than home, with an equalisation of marginal utilities taking place through reductions in 
remittances rather than fully returning home. This might be the case if, for example, migrants develop new ties in 
urban areas that compete with the requirements of family in their rural household (Posel, 2001). 
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how resources are transferred within the household itself, such that remittances are targeted only 
to household members with valid claim, and where channeling these resources to family members 
seen an invalid claimants would result in potential loss of remittance income (Flaherty, 1995 in 
Posel, 2001). 
These utility migration models are compatible with the utility interdependence model 
presented earlier. In particular, they align with a setup incorporating altruistic preferences where 
the utility of other individuals in the household are part of the migrant’s own utility function. 
Apartheid-era planning entrenched the geographical dichotomy between places of residence and 
places of employment, forcing economic migrants to move far away from homes to seek work. 
Remittance flows back home likewise became part of the socio-economic configuration, such that 
even though discriminatory laws were repealed and restrictions lifted with the advent of democracy 
in 1994, structural inequality remains. From 1993 to 2002, Posel (2004) found that temporary 
internal labour migration in South Africa did not decline, something to be expected since families 
were given the legal freedom to migrate. A number of reasons have been put forward for this, 
including that temporary migration patterns take time – sometimes generations – to change. More 
recent evidence has, though, shown this pattern to be changing. Comparisons of national-level 
panel data with earlier national household surveys has shown that, since around 2005 the extent 
of labour migration and remittance receipt has fallen significantly in recent years in South Africa 
(Posel, 2010). While comparability may be limited due to differences in survey composition used 
in this assessment, there is evidence to suggest that increases in receipt of public cash grants by 
households have resulted in a reduction in the contribution of remittances to household income. 
This corresponds to outcomes predicted by the combined utility migration model and altruistic 
private transfer models in situations of significant increases in income of the household at home.  
3.3 Evidence of Crowding Out in South Africa 
Given the evidence of potential crowding out of private by public transfers to households more 
generally, investigation is necessary into whether South Africa’s large social cash transfer system 
experiences similar outcomes. This has implications from both a public policy and research point 
of view. Beneficiaries being targeted may not be receiving the full benefit of the transfer and 
findings on the effectiveness of these cash transfers may not be accurate. Posel (2001) tests three 
hypotheses for the determinants of remittances in South Africa: altruistic behaviour based on 
recipient need; altruistic behaviour based on biological relatedness between household members 
and the migrant; and competing urban opportunities with migrants’ self-regarding motivations for 
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remitting7. Inherent in this setup is the testing for altruistic or exchange (or service)-based 
preference drivers of remittances outlined earlier. Results show that remittances are found to 
increase with the earnings of migrants, an outcome consistent with both types of motivating 
preferences. However, a negative relationship is also found between levels of remittances and the 
level of recipient pre-transfer income, indicating the migrants remit more to those households 
more in need. Additional model outputs show that households that have access to sizeable and 
secure sources of income receive reduced remittance transfers. Taken together, these findings 
support the hypothesis of altruistic motives as the drivers of private transfers to households. There 
is also evidence, however, that migrant’s altruistic behaviour is linked to certain specific types of 
kindred relationships.   
In another important paper on the subject, Jensen (2003) also investigates whether 
government transfer programs displace private transfers to households in South Africa. In 
particular, he focuses on cash transfers that take place through the Government’s Older Person’s 
Grant (OPG)8. Using a basic model of utility inter-dependence within households similar to that 
described in the opening sections of this paper, the author hypothesises that those households that 
receive the OPG receive lower levels of remittances relative to similar households that do not 
receive this grant, ceteris paribus. If true, this would indicate evidence of ‘crowding out’; namely, 
that Government cash transfers displace private transfers to households that receive them. To test 
for this effect, the paper utilises the large increase in the OPG that took place between 1989 and 
1992 as South Africa transitioned to democracy to act as an exogenous driver of changes in 
remittances to households that took place over the same period. The author focuses the analysis 
on a rural, income-poor region, using household surveys in Venda, a former homeland in South 
Africa. The data consist of two identical cross-sectional surveys, administered to approximately 
600 households, conducted in 1989 and 1992 by the Bureau of Market Research at the University 
of South Africa. Two endogeneity concerns are recognised that prohibit a simple comparison of 
remittances received by pensioners and non-pensioners to test for displacement: firstly, factors 
other than age are likely to inform pension take-up by individuals eligible for its receipt; and 
secondly, given that pension receipt is determined by a range of demographic and wealth effects 
may provide a reason for expecting differences in remittance levels between the two groups. The 
author therefore uses gender differentiated age-threshold discontinuities as well as time-series 
variation in the total amount of the pension to generate a difference-in differences-in differences 
(DDD) estimator as a strategy to test for crowding out. The identifying assumption underlying the 
                                                     
7 To secure a share of rural household output or claim to land, for example. 
8Formerly known as the state Old Age Pension 
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model is that “other than receipt of the pension, there were no other factors that affect the level 
of remittances received that changed between 1989 and 1992 in a way that would differentially 
affect men and women at the exact gender-specific pension age thresholds” (Jensen, 2003). The 
results of the DDD analysis provide strong evidence for crowding out, with a relatively large and 
statistically significant impact on remittances received by both pension-eligible women and men. 
On average, it was found that for each Rand of pension income received lead to a 0.3 and 0.26 
rand reduction in private transfers for women and men respectively. These results were found to 
be robust, with further investigation revealing no changes in migration, labour supply or household 
composition in the presence of new pension receipt. 
An interesting approach by Maitra & Ray (2003) examines the impacts of public and private 
transfers on the behaviour and welfare of households in South Africa. The authors use data from 
the South African Integrated Household Survey to examine changes in spending patterns in the 
household. Specifically, the authors focus on whether pensions and private transfers received by 
the household have different impacts on expenditure patterns measured by the share of income 
spent on a range of goods and services. While both resource flows are shown to contribute to 
reduced incidences of poverty in the household, results indicate that private transfers received by 
households have a significant impact on expenditure patterns while the receipt of public pensions 
has little effect. One reason put forward for this finding involves the crowding out of remittances 
received by the household by public cash transfers, the two of which may be seen as substitutes 
for one another. The authors take the analysis a step further by allowing for the endogeneity of 
transfers to the household, relaxing the assumption that public transfers are exogenous in the 
model when calculating the determinants of private transfers. As with other studies in South 
Africa, evidence is found that increased pension receipt results in reduction in remittances 
received. However, these results are qualified; this crowding out effect is found only in the case of 
poorer households. For non-poor households, public and private transfers are seen as 
complements, moving in the same direction. These findings above have important policy 
implications. Large scale cash transfer programs like those in South Africa which have 
distributional considerations in mind may not be as progressive as believed both because part of 
the resource flow accrues to migrants rather than the elderly and because of the asymmetric 
crowding out effects experienced by poor and non-poor households.  
The above results must, however, take into account the relative importance of remittance 
flows to poor and non-poor households. Once way of measuring this is to evaluate the share in 
income derived from different sources. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) use data from 1993, 2000 and 2008 
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and break the income of South African households across the income distribution into different 
components, including: labour market, remittances, capital, government, and other sources. The 
data shows that remittances play a far larger role in the income for poorer households than 
wealthier households. The share of income derived from public sources is also higher for poorer 
households, whereas higher income households obtain the bulk of their earnings from the labour 
market. This suggests that South Africa’s public transfer programs have contributed to reducing 
poverty, especially for the most vulnerable households, and that fears of social grant programs 
being inherently regressive may be allayed. However, assessing the relative shares of these 
components over time shows a growth in the contribution of government grants to poorer 
households’ incomes. For the poorest households, the income share from public grants increases 
from 15% to 29% to 73%, reflecting the increase in the number of state grants being provided 
over the 15 year period (Leibbrandt, et al., 2010). These contributions from public sources have 
steadily replaced the contribution of remittances to total income, which saw a corresponding 
decrease for poorer households. The effect of these changes can be seen to be significant and 
large, providing support for the hypothesis that increases in cash transfers from government to 
the household comes at the expense of remittances received. Analysis by Jensen (2003) builds on 
this, showing that the distributional effects of the OPG are therefore overstated when crowding 
out is not taken into account using poverty measures that look in isolation at the contribution of 
grants to income in the household.  
Findings of a negative relationship between public and private transfers have two 
important implications for analysis and policy-making: firstly, social grants may not be having as 
large an impact on poverty reduction as thought. Research looking at distributional effects of social 
grants tends to picture household income distribution and inequality as simply ‘with-and-without’ 
the social grant contributions. Ignoring the response of private transfers means that the 
distributional and inequality-reducing impacts of social transfers may be overstated. Secondly, and 
conversely, analysis of the impact of public cash transfers on socio-economic outcomes in the 
household likely understates the true effect of grant receipt. Real increases in household income 
lower than predicted means that the ‘developmental return’ per unit of public cash transfer is 
higher than analysis suggests. A plausible extension of this finding to public transfer programs 
beyond the pension implies that benefits from social grant programs seen in the literature thus 
likely form a lower bound in terms of impact. The discussion on the theory and the literature 
surrounding the relationship between public and private transfers has set the basis for the analysis 
to follow. The section that follows presents evidence using recent national-level panel data from 
South Africa to add what it can to the debate.  
25 
 
SECTION II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
4.1 Approach 
The primary consideration for this paper is to test for the displacement of private transfers – or, 
remittances – to households by public transfers. A number of different theories seek to explain 
the underlying drivers of private transfers between households, the two most prominent being 
altruistic and exchange-based preferences, or motives. In the former, care for the recipient’s 
wellbeing results in the transfer of resources, while in the latter these resource transfers are 
motivated by the expected receipt of future benefits. Given an understanding of the cultural and 
social context of South Africa, and resting on previous research that has been undertaken, this 
paper aims to test the altruistic hypothesis. In this paper I test what impact receiving government 
grant funding has on the level of private transfers an individual or household receives from other 
sources. In line with the hypothesis of altruistic motives, I expect that the increases in income from 
grants will result in reductions in the level of remittances received.  
At the core of this hypothesis is the assumption that this increase in public transfer income 
is exogenous. However, it is to be expected that individuals may change their behaviour in 
anticipation of or in response to the receipt of cash grants. An analysis using the reported receipt 
of the grant may therefore be biased as those factors that cause some to take up grant receipt and 
others not to may be omitted. Further, in using survey data, it may be the case that certain 
individuals that do receive the pension report not doing so or, conversely, report receiving the 
pension when in fact they do not. Either way, if this misreporting is systematic then results using 
reported pension receipt will again be biased. Similar to other papers assessing pension impact, I 
use age eligibility for the pension to instrument for reported pension receipt in my analysis to help 
overcome these issues. As explained earlier, pension eligibility is determined primarily by age (along 
with a means test that is, in practice, not rigourously reinforced) which can reasonably be assumed 
to be exogenous. The models presented in this paper therefore revolve around the impact pension 
age-eligibility has on receipt of remittances, with the identifying assumption being the pension-
eligible age of an individual and not reported pension receipt as the exogenous income increase. 
Using a regression design with the age cutoff as a discontinuity, I therefore test the impact that an 
exogenous income transfer in the form of the pension has on the level of remittances received. By 
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comparing individuals just above and just below the age-eligibility threshold, and controlling for 
various individual and household level characteristics, the discontinuity design allows for the true 
impact of the grant to be ascertained by removing external factors that may otherwise bias results.  
I use three strategies in my analysis. The first strategy I present involves regressions at a 
household level for each separate wave. These test the relationship between the level of remittances 
received by the household and the presence of household members of pension-eligible age. 
Regressions are run using OLS as well as a negative binomial model, the latter in an attempt to 
account for the large number of zero observations and non-normal distribution in the dependent 
variable. The second strategy uses pooled data from all three waves and looks at the impact on 
remittances received by individuals who become eligible for the pension. I transform the 
dependent variable to have a more normal distribution, while still retaining the zero observations. 
I run OLS and Tobit regressions on both the untransformed and transformed data. My third 
strategy attempts to deal even further with the large number of zero observations in the data. I use 
a hurdle approach to model separately selection into positive remittance receipt and, conditional 
on it being positive, the level of remittances received. Regressions in all three strategies use age-
eligibility to instrument for reported pension receipt to sidestep issues of endogeneity. All 
regressions also employ a discontinuity design that takes advantage of the age-threshold for 
pension eligibility (argued to be exogenous) to analyse those just above and below the cutoff. 
Finally, I present a series of regressions testing the robustness of the model by looking at a number 
of potential changes within the household linked to pension receipt that may explain some of the 
findings.  
Data used in the analysis is drawn from a nationally-representative panel survey in South 
Africa that surveys individuals over three waves, at three separate points in time. The data contains 
detailed information at both an individual and household level, including on employment, income 
and a range of demographic factors. This dataset provides the opportunity to test the relationship 
between public and private transfers in a South African context where large social spending and a 
history of migratory remittance transfers play important roles in society.  
4.2 Methodology: Cross Sectional Analysis across Waves 
The first identification strategy looks at each wave in isolation. I conduct a cross-sectional analysis 
on each wave separately, testing at the household level the relationship between household 
member eligibility for the pension and remittances received; that is, the relationship between public 
and private transfers received by the household. While cross-sectional analyses lack the empirical 
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explanatory power of panel data, I use this analysis here to gain an initial understanding of the 
results that may be expected from the theories discussed so far. Importantly, it allows for the 
testing of hypotheses using the household as the unit of analysis; evaluation at the household level 
becomes far more difficult when the data is pooled given that the data used tracks individuals – 
and not households – over time. Individuals are free to move between and begin their own 
households. Using the same panel data as I use in this paper, Grieger et al. (2014) provide evidence 
of short-term residential and household compositional change in South Africa. Between the first 
two waves of panel, 10.5% of the population moved residence and 61.3% experienced changes in 
household composition. Using fixed and random effects for households in the pooled data, for 
example, is therefore harder to do given that they are defined only in terms of the individuals that 
currently reside there. The response of the private remittance transfer between households to the 
income derived from the state’s OPG is tested by comparing the level of remittances received by 
households that contain at least one person of pension-eligible age with the level of remittances in 
households with an adult that is not yet age-eligible for the pension. The model’s explanatory 
power draws on the discontinuity around the pension-eligible age. Actual receipt of the pension 
may be influenced by factors other than eligibility alone; age-eligibility thus serves as a suitable 
exogenous instrument for pension receipt. Two methodological approaches are employed. The 
first uses OLS estimation and the second a maximum likelihood estimator in the form of a negative 
binomial regression. The latter is used due to the non-normal distribution nature of the dependent 
variable, discussed further below.  
The first model tests for crowding out using a standard OLS model, where the level of 
remittances received by the household is regressed on indicators of whether households contain 
members who report receiving the pension or not. Reported pension receipt is used here for 
explanatory purposes, while its instrument is discussed next.  The assumption made is that without 
receipt of the pension, remittances received by these respective households would be similar. More 
formally, this regression model can be written as 
𝑌ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑃𝑅ℎ + 𝛾𝑋ℎ + ℎ     (10) 
where 𝑌ℎ is the level of remittances received by household h and 𝑋ℎ represents 
demographic and economic characteristics of the household, including household size, total 
number of children in the household younger than 16, age and age-squared of the household head, 
the level of education of the household head, log of household income, an indicator for urban 
household geotype, and a full set of provincial indicators. The variable 𝑃𝑅ℎ represents the key 
explanatory variable, namely whether a member of household h reports receipt of the state 
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pension. My hypothesis predicts that households with a pension recipient receive lower 
remittances, on average, than similar households that do not have a pension-eligible member, 
ceteris paribus. The coefficient of interest is thus βpr. The OLS estimator I use can be summarised 
in general terms as minimising 
∑ (𝑦ℎ − ?̂?0 − ?̂?1𝑥1)
2𝑛
ℎ=1      (11) 
and assumes, among others, that E[ |𝑋] = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[ |𝑋] = 𝜎2𝐼𝑛; that is, the errors in 
the regression have a conditional mean of zero, and errors are homoskedastistic and uncorrelated 
between observations. Further, the assumption of normality, ε|𝑋~𝒩(0, 𝜎2𝐼𝑛), while not 
necessary for OLS validity, makes OLS inefficient if violated. The assumption of a zero-
conditional mean and that of homoscedasticity is violated in the presence of omitted variable bias. 
Given potential endogeneity in reported pension receipt, I address this using age-eligibility as an 
instrumental variable.  
4.2.1 Age-Eligibility as an Instrument for Pension Receipt 
The strategy employed in this paper is to assess the response of private transfers received by 
households to the receipt of the OPG by members within that household. This can be done, as 
shown in its most basic form above, by comparing the level of remittances received by households 
that contain at least one pensioner, with remittances received by households with an adult(s) who 
is not yet pension-eligible. The influence of a range of other characteristics – generally those related 
to a household’s socio-economic status and member composition – are also controlled for given 
evidence which suggests they may have an impact on results. Identification of pensioners is done 
by using questions included in the survey data that ask an adult whether she/he receives the OPG.  
 Figure 1 below shows reported pension receipt by individuals’ ages. Each graph indicates 
the proportion of African individuals at each age in the data who report actual receipt of the OPG. 
The graphs include calculations for all respondents in the sample, as well as those for men and 
women respondents separately, and are shown for each of the three waves of the dataset. A 
significant change can be seen around the pension age-eligibility threshold, for both men and 
women. At the age of 60, when age-eligibility for the pension is reached, the number of people 
reporting receipt of the OPG increases. The rapidity of the change, while not representing full 
OPG take-up in the sample, lends credence to the potential use of a sharp regression discontinuity 










There are, however, two points to note. The first is that some respondents (both male and 
female) just below the age of 60 report receipt of the pension. This may represent inaccurate 
reporting in the data or may be a result of relative flexibility in the application of the age-cutoff for 
pension receipt. This effect is, however, not large and is not expected to influence the analysis9.  
The second point is that there appears to be a difference between the magnitude of the 
change and in the level of uptake for men and for women. Average reported pension receipt 
increases more gradually for males than it does for females. This finding could have implications 
for the accuracy of my analysis, and may be explained by, among others, two main factors. Firstly, 
the pension eligible age for males has been lowered over the past decade during which the data 
was collected. Whereas before, the age of pension eligibility was 60 for women and 65 for men, 
since 2008 the eligible age for males has decreased until the ages of eligibility for both men and 
women were equalised at 60 in 2010. NIDS survey data was first collected in 2008, implying that 
there may already be some evidence of these changes when assessing proportional pension uptake, 
but that we would still expect to see lower proportions of men than women reporting pension 
receipt around the 60 year age cutoff. This is apparent when looking at the graph for Wave 1 which 
shows a sharp spike around age 65 for men, but which shifts left over the next two waves to 
indicate earlier take up. Secondly, lower reported pension-uptake by men around the age-eligibility 
cutoff may be due to the fact that men are more likely than women to continue working past the 
age of 60. 
Given the magnitude of changes noted around the age threshold, endogeneity in the 
reported receipt of the pension is therefore an analytical issue of concern. This is also the case in 
theory, for while it would seem straightforward to simply compare the level of remittances received 
by households in which a pensioner reported receiving the OPG with households in which no 
member reported receipt of the pension, take-up of the OPG might be a decision endogenous to 
the household (Edmonds, 2006). Using reported receipt as an explanatory variable could cause the 
model to suffer from omitted variable bias if individual behavioral change – which is not able to 
be controlled for in the model – influences the receipt of the pension. Non-monetary factors, such 
as effort and patience levels, motivation, or health circumstances, for example, may make it less 
likely that a particular individual will actively go and receive the pension. In the case where these 
factors also positively affect the likelihood of receiving remittances (or the level of remittances 
received), then households that actually receive the OPG are likely to be positively correlated with 
                                                     
9 This is because the proportion of those aged below 60 who report pension receipt is relatively small, at 3.38% of the total 
sample used in the panel analysis.  
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the level of remittances received. In this scenario, estimates of the impact of the OPG on private 
transfers to households will therefore exhibit an upward bias. Problems also arise in the accuracy 
of reported pension receipt. If survey data systematically under or over-reports pension receipt 
due to, for example, perceptions around the nature of the survey interview or interviewer, then 
estimation using this data will likely also be biased. It is not apparent here why certain income- and 
age-eligible individuals choose not to receive the pension or, conversely and perhaps more 
interestingly, why certain age-eligible individuals choose not to report receipt of the pension. In 
general then, using survey responses to questions involving pension receipt may result in untrue 
estimates of the impact of the pension on households remittances received. 
One way of dealing with this analytical problem is to focus on individuals’ eligibility for 
the pension rather than their actual reported receipt. The fact that individuals become eligible for 
the OPG once they reach a certain age generates a discontinuity around this age threshold that is 
useful to exploit. The rationale underlying this uses the fact that, below a certain means-test 
threshold that is rarely enforced in practice10, as the OPG depends solely on a person’s age, 
eligibility for the pension is determined entirely by an individual’s date of birth. Whether age-
eligibility is an appropriate instrument for reported receipt of the OPG must be tested. In equation 
(10) earlier, if 𝑃𝑅ℎ is a potentially endogenous variable representing reported OPG receipt in the 
data, then the use of an instrument (𝑃ℎ) must ensure that two important assumptions hold:  
Assumption (IV1):   𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃ℎ, ) = 0   (16) 
Assumption (IV2):   𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃ℎ, 𝑃𝑅ℎ) ≠ 0    
The first assumption states that the instrument must not be correlated with the error term 
from the original regression that includes the endogenous variable. While this relationship cannot 
be explicitly tested, it can be strongly argued that the assumption of exogeneity of age-eligibility 
holds true and that pension-eligibility determined by age is not correlated with the error term. It is 
reasonable to assume that an individual’s date of birth is unrelated to any relevant personal 
characteristics (Hamoudi and Thomas 2005). This approach has been used in a South African 
context in a number of different papers, including research on labour migration (Ranchod, 2009), 
child health and education outcomes (Duflo, 2000), labour market outcomes of youth (Ardington, 
et al., 2013), child labour and schooling responses (Edmonds, 2006), and remittance receipt (Posel, 
2001; Jensen, 2003; Case & Deaton, 1998; Maitra & Ray, 2002). To test the second assumption, I 
                                                     
10 It is not practically enforced because the proportion of households falling below this means threshold is high, 
particularly for African households in South Africa.  
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run a regression of reported pension receipt on a variable indicating the number of people age-
eligible for the pension in the household and find a large, positive and significant correlation. The 
strength of the IV (IV2) is tested by the F-Statistic on this regression of the instrument on the 
endogenous variable in question. Results indicate a test statistic of F(1,9510) = 11,624.18 (with 
Prob > F = 0.000), confirming the second assumption above. 
Hence, in equation (10) I replace the indicator for reported pension receipt in the 
household (𝑃𝑅ℎ) with a variable (𝑃ℎ) indicating the total number of people of pension-eligible age 
resident in the household. While actual reported receipt of the pension may be influenced by 
factors other than eligibility alone, age-eligibility thus serves as a suitable exogenous instrument for 
pension receipt. A model using a discontinuity design can therefore draw explanatory power from 
the change in pension-eligibility around the age cutoff. More specifically, the core approach taken 
in this paper is thus to use a sharp regression discontinuity design in testing the hypothesis put 
forward. Simply, this design compares the level of remittances received by those aged just above 
the pension age-eligibility cut-off (60 years) separately to those aged just below.  
Pension eligibility is therefore used to explain difference in the level of remittances 
observed between households with similar characteristics, the identifying assumption being that 
no factors other than pension receipt influence the amount of remittances received. 
4.2.2 Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
The assumption of normality in the dependent variable is violated if the error term is not 
normally distributed. This is a potential problem for the model here, as shown in Figure 2 below 
which looks at the distribution of remittances received by households in each of the waves. Two 
points in particular are evident across all three waves: firstly, a significant proportion of households 
report no remittance receipt; and, secondly, the frequency of remittance receipt reported decreases 
as the value of remittances increases. Further, this decrease in frequency happens at a decreasing 
rate, implying a distribution that is not normal but is skewed towards zero. It would therefore be 





Figure 2: Distribution of variable 'total household remittances received', by wave 
   
  
  
One approach is to use a Poisson estimator more sensitive to the mean which will shift the 
mass of the distribution left in the case where a significant proportion of the observations are zero. 
While a Poisson approach is generally used for count data, Wooldridge (2010) notes that even if 
the dependent variable is continuous, as long as it is non-negative and has no natural upper bound 
(as is the case in the remittances variable here) Poisson estimators can still be used effectively and 
will still present consistent, asymptotically normal coefficient estimates. The same applies whether 
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or not the Poisson distribution holds. However, an important restriction on the dependent variable 
in the Poisson model is the requirement that the variance is equal to the mean: 
Var(𝑦|𝒙) = E(𝑦|𝒙)     (12) 
This stems from the fact that all probabilities and higher moments of the Poisson 
distribution are based entirely on the mean, which is often violated in the case of non-negative 
continuous variables (Wooldridge, 2010). When the variance exceeds the mean, the model is said 
to be ‘overdispersed’. As in the case here, where there are excessive zero observations the 
requirement that the variance of y equals its mean is unlikely to hold and the Poisson model is no 
longer appropriate. One way to address this is to introduce an individual, random effect into the 
conditional mean of the Poisson model, which represents the unobserved heterogeneity in the data 
(Greene, 2008). A negative binomial model that includes this random effect relaxes the 
variance/mean equality assumption and allows for the mean and variance to be different. One 
form of the negative binomial distribution with 𝜆 as the mean of the distribution and 𝛼 as the 
over-dispersion parameter takes the form 













   (13) 
with the log-likelihood function to be maximised shown by 
















  (14) 
where     
   𝜇𝑖 = E(𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊) = 𝑒
(𝑥𝑖𝛽)     (15) 
The key difference between the Poisson and negative binomial models is thus simply the 
inclusion of 𝛼, which is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution. In the case where 𝛼 = 0, the 
negative binomial distribution is the same as the Poisson distribution. The larger 𝛼 is, the greater 
the overdispersion and the further the distribution mass shifts to the left. After finding evidence 
of overdispersion in the Poisson model, I therefore run the model presented in line (10) using a 
negative binomial regression to account for the skewness of the data.  
A second, simplified regression model creates dummy variables for adults’ ages in the 
neighbourhood of the pension discontinuity, and includes them in a regression on the level of 
remittances received by households. This provides a useful, intuitive understanding of the impact 
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of the pension on monetary transfers received by households: by comparing households in which 
an adult is present who just qualifies for the pension (on or just above the age eligible threshold) 
with other similar households in which an adult only just fails to meet the eligibility requirement 
(just below the age threshold) means that, on average, the only difference between the remittances 
received by households can be attributed to the receipt of the OPG. Let 𝑌(𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑎𝑔𝑒) indicate 
the average level of remittances received by households that contain at least one pensioner of a 
given gender {M, F} and age {60-64, 65-69, 70+}. The model exploits the age thresholds to create 
a regression discontinuity design in the forms 
𝑌ℎ =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒(60 − 64) + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒(65 − 69) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒(70 +) + 𝛾𝑋ℎ +  ℎ  (17) 
& 
𝑌ℎ =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(60 − 64)ℎ + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(65 − 69)ℎ + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(70 +)ℎ
+ 𝛿1𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(60 − 64)ℎ +  𝛿2𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(65 − 69)ℎ + 𝛿3𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒(70 +)ℎ + 𝛾𝑋ℎ +  ℎ 
where 𝑌h  is the average level of remittances received by household h and 𝑋ℎ represents 
other demographic and economic characteristics of the household. The first equation presents the 
discontinuity using households containing a pension-eligible individual of either gender, and the 
second separates the sample into households with either a pension-eligible female or male 
present.11  Individuals are grouped together in 5-year age-range indicators (for example, all those 
aged 54-59 are grouped together, age 60-64 etc.), such that the independent variables of interest 
are understood in line with the following example: 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒(60 − 64)ℎ is an indicator equal to 1 
if a household contains at least one female adult member aged between or equal to 60 and 64 years, 
and 0 otherwise. Only those households with at least one adult member aged 50 or older are 
included in the regression sample. This is important as the discontinuity design aims to compare 
similar households around the age cut-off. Households with only younger adults present are likely 
to be very different to those with members close to retirement (and pension-eligible) age. After 
including an indicator for whether the oldest person in the household is male, the base group 
against which the pension-eligible households are compared in the model therefore include 
households with an adult female aged between 50 and 59. The two models are important in 
understanding both the effects of pension receipt on household remittances received and the 
gender differentials in these effects.  
                                                     
11 Across the waves, only a small proportion of households have both a male and female person of pension-eligible 
age present. These households will therefore reflect both of these individuals in the model.  
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The hypothesis being tested is whether, on average, households with at least one person 
age-eligible for the pension receive lower remittances than households with similar characteristics 
that are not eligible for the pension but have a member near the age-eligible threshold. Evidence 
of this would be negative, statistically significant coefficients 𝛽2 for female pensioners and 𝛿2 for 
male pensioners. As with the previous model, the RDD design is run using OLS and negative 
binomial estimation methods.  
4.3 Methodology: Panel Analysis using Pooled Data 
The second identification strategy pools data from across the waves and uses this sample to explore 
the relationship between public and private transfers. The use of cross-sectional data makes it 
difficult to infer causal relationships between variables. In using cross-sectional data in the manner 
described in the previous section, it is necessary that both the pension and remittances are strictly 
exogenous in the sample. This assumption is violated and results biased if, inter alia, pension and 
remittance receipt in the household are spuriously correlated through dynamics not controlled for 
in cross-sectional analysis. One way of attempting to overcome this endogeneity problem is to 
control for as many other relevant factors in the analysis as the data allows. However, while certain 
important influences may be included in a regression model, there are certain factors likely to lead 
to biased results that may not be as easily controlled for. For example, if certain households are 
more likely to actually collect pensions they are entitled to, then the effects of these omitted 
variables would cause the results of any analysis between the two factors to be biased. It may be 
that households that are more likely to have offspring that are working away from home (and/or 
more likely to be sending monetary transfers home) have greater positive agency in the collection 
of the pension. Addressing endogeneity concerns related to reported pension receipt by using age-
eligibly as an instrumental variable (as described in the previous section) may not sufficiently 
control for these unseen influences.  
Panel datasets offer an alternative approach, generating more powerful means of 
establishing causation by observing respondents over time. By comparing respondents before and 
after an event or an intervention has occurred, for example, unseen variables do not need to be 
controlled for as they are expected to be constant over time. I therefore use panel data analysis in 
an attempt to deal with potential issues inherent in the cross-sectional analyses conducted. The 
data used follows respondents over three waves using an individual-specific identifier. Whereas 
the cross-sectional analysis looked at the household as the unit of analysis, this is more difficult 
using data that tracks individuals, not households, over time. Pooling data and analysing at a 
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household level would require assumptions to be made about what exactly constitutes a household. 
While assumptions could be made (using household size and composition, for example), this may 
be problematic and it is unclear how exactly the household should be defined, which would be 
necessary should the aim be to compare the same households over time or control for time and 
household specific effects. However, as discussed earlier, the data is structured such that 
respondents may leave households between waves to start new households, join different 
households of move away entirely.  
Given these difficulties, my analysis of the pooled data takes place at the individual level. 
The amount of remittances received at a household level that was used as the dependent variable 
in the previous analysis is an aggregate of total remittances received by all individual adult members 
of the household.12 Information on remittances is contained in a survey questionnaire for adult 
household members aged 15 or above. A question is asked as to whether the respondent receives 
remittances or not and details each of the different remittance sources and the amount received. 
Remittances may be sent as monetary transfers or in-kind. My analysis here focuses on monetary 
transfers only given difficulties associated with valuing in-kind items. The dependent variable I use 
in the analyses that follows are the total amount of remittances received by an adult respondent. 
One econometric issue of concern I address later is again that the dependent variable contains a 
large number of zero values. Similar to the cross-sectional household level analysis outlined earlier, 
reported pension receipt in the data may not be exogenous. It may instead be influenced by a 
number of unobserved factors that would, if not controlled for, lead to biased results.  
The primary explanatory variable used in the analysis is therefore an indicator of individual 
age-eligibility for the state pension, which instruments for reported pension receipt. It was argued 
earlier that age-eligibility for the pension serves as a suitable instrumental variable for its receipt 
and the same logic is used here. The empirical strategy again takes advantage of the reality that 
individuals cannot choose their date of birth. This makes a strong case for the fact that whether a 
person is eligible for the pension (over the age of 60) or not is exogenous to the model. Caution 
must, however, be taken in assuming perfect exogeneity, with two concerns in particular worth 
noting. Firstly, another requirement for OPG eligibility is a means test that stipulates that single 
individuals must not earn more than R64 680 per year or have a combined income of more than 
R129 360 if married.13 Given the income-poor nature of most state pension applicants, this means 
                                                     
12 In each of the waves, a small proportion of remittances are imputed. See the NIDS website (www.nids.uct.ac.za) 
for further information on this. In this paper I use remittance data with full imputations.   
13 Further, individuals must not own assets worth more than R930 600 if single, or R1 861 200 in combination with 
a partner if married.   
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test is rarely enforced in reality. In the sample used here, no individuals eligible for the pension 
earned above the wage threshold, whether individually or combined. Selection into or out of the 
sample based on the means test exclusion criteria is therefore not an issue in the analysis here. The 
second concern involves potential behavioural changes by individuals who are about to or have 
recently become age-eligible for pension receipt. Results will be biased if these behavioural changes 
associated with pension receipt influence the level of remittances an individual receives. To test 
this, I run a series of regressions of pension-eligibility on a range of dependent variables that might 
be expected to influence remittance receipt, including levels of employment in the household, 
changes in the number of children living in the household, and changes in household composition. 
The analysis here looks to test the relationship between public transfers (as measured by 
receipt of the OPG) and private transfers (as measured by monetary remittances received) to 
individuals. The estimation approach is based on the theoretical discussion presented earlier, and 
on line (9) in particular, which describes the equality in marginal utilities of different household 
members under an altruistic-driven hypothesis of private transfers. My identification strategy again 
rests on using pension age-eligibility as an instrument for pension receipt in a regression on the 
level of remittances received. I compare the level of remittances received by individuals aged 60 
or just above who are eligible for the pension with those aged just below who are not eligible. The 
identifying assumption is again pension-eligibility which explains the differences observed between 
the two groups. This is done at an individual level using the pooled panel data which allows for 
the inclusion of fixed and random-effects in regression models.  
The use of panel data implies potential endogeneity in the final sample. This is because 
individuals across all waves are treated as unique, even though they may be the same respondent 
at different points in time. I therefore use random effects in my regressions to control for this 
potential endogeneity. As a check for robustness, I also use a model that includes fixed effects 
instead, while being cognisant of its limitations with respect to the data being used (namely, the 
pooling of responses from the same individuals over time). I briefly compare the results from the 
two models including random and fixed effects, respectively, and conclude that fixed effects is not 
useful and random effects is more appropriate to the regression design. I continue to use random 
effects in my base model and all other models going forward. 
Remittances received by adults are a function of their pension age eligibility, where i is the 
individual respondent and t is the period in the model 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡    (18) 
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This is the estimator applied to the different cross sections earlier, except now the analysis 
is being conducted at an individual rather than household level, and is dynamic rather than static. 
The variable 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is an age-eligibility indicator equal to one if individual i is 60 or older in time t . I 
use this indicator as an instrument for reported pension receipt in a 2SLS regression. I include a 
regression that uses actual reported pension receipt for comparative purposes. Controls are 
captured by 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 which consists of a range of household and individual level variables, including 
the number of members in the individual’s household, the number of children younger than 16 in 
the household, log of non-remittance household income, age and age-squared of the household 
head, education of the household head, an indicator if the person is a male, an indicator if the 
person lives in an urban area, province dummies and dummies for the panel period. Some 
specifications may also include an individual fixed or random effect, 𝜇, such that  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝑖,𝑡     (19) 
In addition, I again use a sharp regression discontinuity design around the age-eligible 
threshold, which is identical to the second model described by equations (17) using age-groupings 
but uses individual- and time-related observations rather than observations at a household level.  
To better understand the effectiveness of the overall methodological approach in the 
pooled data, the graphs in Figure 3 explore the change in remittances around the pension age-
eligibility threshold for the pooled sample. The first graph shows average remittances received by 
respondents’ ages, broken into male and female respondents respectively. While the graph shows 
a high degree of volatility, a decrease in the average remittances received for those aged 60 and 
above can be seen, relative to those aged just below 60. This applies to both male and female 
respondents. The second set of graphs plot instead the log of mean remittances on the y-axis in 
an attempt to remove some of this volatility. The change around the age-threshold is again 
confirmed. All graphs plot a quadratic fit line for ages below 60 and another for ages 60 and above. 
The trend lines show increases in average remittances received leading up to age 60 and thereafter 
a relatively flat trajectory at a lower level. These trends look similar for men and for women and 
support the use of a sharp regression discontinuity design in the regressions that follow.  
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Figure 3: Average level of remittances received by respondent, by age and gender 
 
 
A cause for concern mentioned earlier relates to the distributional nature of the dependent 
variable being used. The graphs in Figure 4 below show the distribution of remittances received 
by individuals in the sample. Looking at the first graphs on the variable in its current 
untransformed form, two aspects in particular are likely to have an impact on the econometric 
models used and must be addressed. The first concern relates to the significant number of zero 
















































only those that receive remittances; this is likely to lead to selection bias. The second concern 
relates to the highly non-normal distribution of the dependent variable. Both of these factors 
suggest that OLS may not be an appropriate estimator to use in the current circumstances.  
One way of addressing the issue of non-normal distribution is to transform the data to 
change the distribution of non-zero observations. A simple log transformation that is often used 
when dealing with skewed distributions in income data is not appropriate here due to the high 
number of zero observations, which would then be dropped from the sample (log of zero is 
undefined). In line with the literature14 I therefore transform the data in two ways, both of which 
also allow for the retention of zero-observations while making the distribution of the dependent 
variable more appropriate for analysis. In the first, I take the log of remittances received ‘plus one’ 
which redistributes the non-zero observations while keeping those that report zero remittances 
received. While potentially useful, this method may not be regarded as technically correct in that 
in allocates remittance values to those that do not actually receive any remittances. An alternative 
approach is the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation, defined as  
𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ−1(𝑦𝑖) = log (𝑦𝑖 + (𝑦𝑖
2 + 1)1/2)   (20) 
Mackinnon & Magee (1990) describe in detail this transformation which is increasingly 
being used to deal with zero and negative values when transforming data.15 Like the log 
transformation, the IHS transformation has the effect of pulling extreme positive values towards 
other transformed observations and behaves like the log transformation for large enough values 
(Burbidge, et al., 1988). Other than when y is very small, the IHS can be interpreted in the same 
way as a standard logarithmic dependent variable, except that the IHS is defined at zero. A feature 
of the IHS transformation is the fact that the log-likelihood function for IHS is therefore also 
defined for zero values of the dependent variable (Burbidge, et al., 1988). This is a characteristic 
that will be useful later on when using estimators from the maximum likelihood family. Figure 4 
presents the distributions of the untransformed dependent variable and these two transformations. 
Compared to the original distribution, the values of remittances received now follow a distribution 
pattern that, while still containing a large number of zero observations, is more normally 
distributed for positive values of remittances received. OLS regressions on panel data using these 
                                                     
14 See Cameron & Trivedi (2005) for a discussion on these micro-economic approaches. 
15 This is particularly useful when dealing with income data. See, for example, Pence (2006) and Friedline et al. 
(2015). The IHS transformation was first proposed in Johnson (1949).  
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transformed variables provide the base model used in this paper, the results of which are tested 
for robustness through other changes to the data and econometric techniques.  




While I have dealt with the distributional concerns surrounding the dependent variable, 
the large presence of zero observations poses challenges to traditional methods of estimation. 
Wooldridge (2010) discusses the potential bias in using OLS when dealing with data containing 
many zero observations in the dependent variable. The remittances variable here represents a 
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corner solution response type of limited dependent variable, where the variable is equal to zero for 
a significant proportion of the sample but which is otherwise generally continuously distributed 
over a range of positive values. While using a linear model may, in fact, be a good approximation 
of the data, there is the possibility of obtaining negative fitted values, leading to negative 
predictions of y (Wooldridge, 2010). This is impossible in the variable being used here. I therefore 
explore different methods of estimation for the now transformed data that aim to account for this.  
Case & Deaton (1998), in analysing the impact of pension income on various expenditure 
items in households in South Africa, suggest that in situations where the presence of zeros renders 
OLS inappropriate, this can be dealt with by estimating Tobits instead. The Tobit estimator 
presents maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients by maximizing the log-likelihood for a 
random sample (Tobin, 1958). Tobit models provide a useful estimation option which present 
non-negative predicted values for y but which still satisfy the classical linear model assumptions 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Given the relatively normal distribution of the transformed variable for 
observations above zero, I therefore use a Tobit estimator in addition to OLS estimation methods. 
Tobit results are usually larger than OLS coefficients which is consistent with the presence of 
genuine censoring (Case & Deaton, 1998). I run the Tobit regressions on the pooled data and 
include random effects. 
While the Tobit model is often the standard approach used in modelling a dependent 
variable that indicates a sizeable number of zero values, it is important to understand what this 
zero represents. The zero can either be an answer given to a particular question or an absence of 
an answer as the question was not posed to the respondent. In the former situation, having zeros 
in the model simply represents a form of censoring, with zero as the lower limit. In the latter, it is 
apparent that the zero value does not represent censoring but is the outcome of a discrete decision 
made (Greene, 2008). This latter situation is the case in the data here, where zeros in the amount 
of remittances received represent those who do not receive remittances at all.16 What causes some 
individuals to receive remittances and others not may have implications on the outcome of the 
analysis. More specifically, there is a need to take into account the fact that separate processes may 
determine selection into positive remittance receipt and the level of remittances received (for those 
that receive remittances). The regression models presented thus far do not address this need.  
                                                     
16 By contrast, censoring would suggest that people actively receive remittances amounting to zero, which is a 
contradiction. It is noted that the zeros in the dependent variable here have been created by recoding information 
on remittances from missing to zero for those individuals that do not report receiving remittances.  
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A strategy I therefore use here, as an alternative to the censored Tobit, is a hurdle model 
approach. The hurdle model allows me to model separately the reasons underlying the receipt of 
remittances from the level of remittances received. Further, the hurdle model helps address the 
difficulties associated with the distribution of the transformed data, which retains zero 
observations and is seen to be not normally distributed when looking at the sample as a whole. 
The hurdle model embodies a two-tier approach: the first determines selection into positive 
remittance receipt; and the second explains the level of remittances received, conditional on this 
positive remittance receipt. In the first tier I therefore run a Probit estimator with the dependent 
variable equal to 1 if an individual receives some positive remittance income. In the second tier, a 
truncated regression model (with a lower limit equal to 0) is then run on a restricted sample that 
includes only those respondents who reported positive remittance receipt. This second tier model 
assumes a normal distribution of the dependent variable that has been scaled upward so that the 
distribution integrates to one over the restricted range. The dependent variable I use in the second 
tier is the IHS transformed variable which, as shown in Figure 4, has a relatively normal distribution 
for remittances greater than zero. I also present a separate hurdle model that includes the log of 
non-remittance household income in the analysis given the inverse relationship between 
remittances and income expected under the hypothesis being tested. These regressions are run on 
the pooled data with standard errors clustered at the household level.  
4.4 Data 
Data used in this paper is drawn from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), South 
Africa’s first nationally representative panel study. The NIDS dataset contains surveys at both the 
household and individual levels. The household level survey asks a knowledgeable adult to list all 
individuals usually living in the household as well as provide household level information. The 
individual level surveys are comprised of, inter alia, an adult questionnaire (asked directly to an adult 
household member directly) and a child questionnaire (a sufficiently knowledgeable adult or 
caregiver is interviewed on behalf of the child). NIDS surveys, as per their mandate, contain a 
strong focus on income in the household and are thus useful for this analysis. Questions pertaining 
to income levels and sources, as well as a range of different individual and household-level socio-
economic factors, are asked consistently across the surveys.  
The purpose of using the NIDS dataset for this analysis is two-fold. Firstly, this paper aims 
to expand the literature on the relationship between public and private transfers using recent, 
detailed, comprehensive, and good quality survey data.  Few datasets meeting such criterion on a 
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national scale currently exist in a developing country context. NIDS is rigorously collected, 
validated and published by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), 
University of Cape Town, and is regarded as a sound set of data. The data therefore provides a 
good opportunity for analysis; its strong focus on income in the household has already provided 
the basis for a large body of research17, including that focused on the impacts of South Africa’s 
social grant system. That NIDS is nationally representative also allows for the testing of the 
relationship between public and private transfers on a scale in South Africa that few studies have 
thus far been based. Secondly, thus far NIDS has been conducted over three waves, beginning in 
2008, with intervals of around three years between each survey. This provides an opportunity to 
use both cross-sectional and panel data techniques in analysing the data. Given that the NIDS 
project is expected to continue in the future, further surveys will also allow for the building of 
evidence over time and continuous testing of hypotheses.  
The data is set up to allow for analyses testing the response of private transfers received 
by individuals and households to the receipt of public cash grants. I run cross sectional analyses 
on each wave separately before analysing pooled data from all three waves. For the purposes of 
this paper, the analyses are limited to African18 individuals and households only. This is due to the 
fact that there are far more observations for African respondents in the sample (given their higher 
relative proportion of the population19) as well as due to their typically higher response rates in 
comparison to other racial groups (Ardington & Leibbrandt, 2010). To identify the race of a 
household for the cross section regressions, race information collected in the adult questionnaire 
was mapped onto the household. African households were then identified by including those for 
whom the race of the household head was African.20 Further, the sample includes only individuals 
over the age of 50 in the pooled data and only households in which at least one member is over 
the age of 50 in the cross sectional analysis. Evidence of migration into and out of households 
between waves may have an impact of results, as will problems of attrition. I therefore limit the 
panel data analysis to a balanced panel sample, only including those individuals for whom 
information is available in all three waves.21 All variables relating to income and remittances have 
been adjusted using deflators provided with the NIDS data. These are based on the national 
                                                     
17 For a summary of this research, visit the NIDS website (http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/publications/citations) 
18 While the racial classification ‘African’ comes with its own set of socio-political dynamics, this term has been used 
here to align with that used in the NIDS surveys.  
19 National census statistics indicate that African people represent over 80% of the South African population. In the 
pooled NIDS sample here, African people represent around 85% of people in the sample.  
20 I note there are a small number of mixed-race households in the sample but this is not expected to alter results.  
21 I conduct a separate analysis using an unbalanced panel of all observations across the waves, with results similar to 
those presented in this paper. Regressions using unbalanced data for the paper’s baseline regression models can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
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headline CPI index and account for changes in the real value of money between the waves. All 
regressions contain an indicator for each wave to account for exogenous changes that impact 
individuals over time. Prior to running the full regression analysis, the tables below present selected 
summary statistics that provide an initial basis for testing the crowding out hypothesis. The first 
table looks at data at a household level for each of the separate waves. The second table uses 
pooled data from the three waves and is presented at the level of the individual.   
In Table 1, A ‘pension-eligible’ household is one in which at least one adult within the 
household is aged 60 or above and is thus age-eligible for the pension. Across the three waves, 
households with at least one person of pension-eligible age present are seen to be bigger and have 
a higher proportion of household members younger than 16. This accords with a large body of 
evidence, some presented earlier, that suggests that the elderly in South Africa play a large role in 
raising of children. Households with pension-eligible people also have older household heads and 
have heads with less education, on average. Households with older people of pension-eligible age 
tend to be poorer on average; total income and total non-remittance household income can be 
seen to be lower across all waves, but only significantly so in waves 1 and 2. Average remittances 
received in the full sample are significantly lower for pension-eligible households in wave 3 only, 
and the same applies to the restricted sample which includes only those households that receive a 
positive level of remittances. The lack of significance in the statistical difference (between pension-
eligible vs non-eligible households) may be due to the small proportion of households that report 
positive remittance receipt. Overall, the direction of the various differences support the hypothesis 




Table 1: Summary statistics of household characteristics, by wave 




















Urban 0.809 0.778 ** 0.803 0.793  0.806 0.792  
Household size 4.433 4.934 *** 4.938 5.562 *** 4.86 5.299 *** 
Fraction of household 
aged <=16 
0.29 0.324 *** 0.304 0.326 *** 0.305 0.325 ** 
HH head's age 51.67 67.61 *** 46.99 63.05 *** 46.88 58.3 *** 
HH head's education 4.813 2.839 *** 5.533 3.151 *** 6.24 4.374 *** 
          
Household income          
Total 3,958 3,515 *** 5,043 3,889 ** 4,983 4,326  
Total less remittances 3,777 3,300 *** 4,923 3,806 *** 4,797 4,192  
Remittances received by 
households 
         
Proportion of HH 
reporting remittance 
receipt 
0.149 0.163  0.081 0.077  0.146 0.121  
Full sample 181.2 215.6  107.3 76.25  171 125.2 ** 
Restricted sample ^ 964 1,047  1,207 903  1,177 1,035 * 
          
Observations 1,254 1,371  1,510 1,567  1,628 1,751  
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 using a Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic. The sample is limited to African households in 
which at least one adult is over the age of 50. ^ Restricted sample includes only those households that report positive remittance receipt. 
In comparing different groups in Table 2, I make use of different person types based on 
pension-eligibility status. A ‘pension-eligible’ person is an individual who is aged 60 or above and 
is thus eligible for the South African state OPG. The first two columns present means for the 
sample broken into those individuals eligible for the pension and those not. The last two columns 
look only at those who are eligible for the pension, separated into males and females. No difference 
is apparent in the proportion of pension and non-pension eligible people living in urban versus 
rural areas. This is interesting given the role of remittances in urban to rural resource transfers and 
suggests that this driver of remittances may not be as important as it used to be. Pension-eligible 
individuals are seen to live in households that are slightly larger, on average, and that have a higher 
proportion of children under the age of 16 living in the household. This accords with evidence 
that suggests that grandparents and the elderly play a sizeable role in raising children, in particular 
for those children who have lost a parent. Ardington & Leibbrandt (2010) explore the relationship 
between orphanhood and children’s education outcomes in South Africa and find that shifts in 
the pattern of care giving for orphans show an increasing reliance on grandparents as caregivers. 
Schatz & Ogeunmefun (2007) find evidence that older women play a vital role in caring for 
grandchildren in South Africa (and granddaughters in particular) in response to HIV/AIDS deaths 
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of their mothers. The age of the household head is higher in pension-eligible households, which 
is expected given that this roll generally falls on the most senior member of the household. The 
education of the household head is also seen to be lower in pension-eligible vs non-eligible 
households, most likely a reflection of the previously unequal education system during the 
apartheid-era. The statistics involving remittances present a first look at the relationship between 
remittances and the pension. Total household income is lower in households although the 
difference is not significant, likely due to the volatility in the household income variable. Average 
non-remittance household income is, however, significantly lower for households in which a 
pension-eligible person is present. The same is true when grant income is also removed.  
Table 2: Summary statistics from pooled panel data 




 Pension eligible only  
    Females Males  
Household demographics       
Urban 0.812 0.801  0.804 0.793  
Household Size 4.946 5.097 *** 5.106 5.054  
Fraction of household aged <=16 0.294 0.324 *** 0.337 0.282 *** 
HH head's age 50.88 63.23 *** 63.37 62.75 *** 
HH head's education 5.263 3.438 *** 3.356 3.719 *** 
       
Household income       
Total 4,906 3,974  3,783 4,621 *** 
Total less remittances 4,755 3,855 * 3,663 4,503 *** 
Total less remittances less grant income 2,699 1,866 *** 1,735 2,317 *** 
Remittances received by individuals       
Full sample 70.66 44.89 *** 52.98 18.16 *** 
Restricted sample ^ 1,062 939.6  920.5 1,175  
       
Observations 4,742 4,233  3,268 965  
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 using a Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic. The sample is limited to African individuals 
aged 50 or older. ^ Restricted sample includes only those individuals that report positive remittance receipt. 
Looking at remittances more specifically, average remittances in the full sample are 
significantly lower for adults of pension-eligible age than those below the age cutoff. The large 
number of zero observations in the remittance variable, however, make these means artificially 
low. Looking at a restricted sample including only those who report positive remittance receipt, 
the means are higher overall and lower for pension-eligible individuals, on average. This result is, 
however, not significant which is again a likely manifestation of the volatility inherent in income-
related variables in the sample. Differences in findings based on gender indicate that pension-
eligible women tend to live in bigger households and with more children than do pension-eligible 
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men, and in households with lower levels of income. Looking at the restricted sample, women 
report lower levels of remittances than men, although the result is not significant. Overall, the 
findings provide some evidence that receipt of the pension is linked to lower levels of remittances 
received. This is similar to other findings from South Africa by, among others, Jensen (2003) who 
finds similar patterns in income at a household level, and Posel et al. (2006) who find that the 
receipt and value of remittances is greater in households that do not receive the state pension than 
those that do.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Cross Sectional Regressions across Waves 
Table 3 shows the results of cross-sectional regressions on data from the three waves. This is the 
first identification strategy which analyses at household level the relationship between remittances 
and pension received. Columns (1) and (2) represent OLS regressions from Wave 1, columns (3) 
and (4) from Wave 2, and columns (5) and (6) from Wave 3 data. Further, columns (1), (3), and 
(5) represent the discontinuity design including the number of pension-eligible individuals of either 
gender in the household, while columns (2), (4), and (6) represent a sharp regression discontinuity 
design using age-groupings around the pension age-eligibility threshold for women and men 
respectively. Across the waves, each pensioner in the household is associated with a reduction in 
average remittances to the household of between R63 (w1) and R48 (w3), all else equal. This result 
is significant for waves 2 and 3 but not wave 1. Given that the average remittances received by 
households with no pension-eligible members is around R205 (w1) and R160 (w3), this represents 
an approximately 30% reduction in average remittances received due to the receipt of the pension, 
all else equal. 
Looking at households that contain female and male members aged just above the 
eligibility threshold, while the coefficients on all terms are negative, the level of significance varies 
across the waves. In waves 1 and 3, households with women aged just above the threshold are 
seen to significantly reduce average remittances received by between R66 and R100. The presence 
of a male household member aged above the cutoff is significant only in wave 2, with an associated 
decrease in remittances of around R90. In almost all regressions, increases in household size are 
seen to significantly reduce remittances received, while having additional children aged below 16 
in the household is seen to increase average remittances received. The latter can generally be 
explained by parents sending money home for children staying with relatives (who are often elderly 
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as noted earlier) while the former is more complex. It may represent the fact that, holding the 
number of children in the household constant, larger households mean fewer adult members are 
working away from home. Overall, results are marginal and coefficients on the higher age brackets 
must be viewed with caution given the small sample numbers with which they are associated. The 
results are also relatively small; while average remittances for households with no pension-eligible 
members is R205 (w1) / R160 (w3), conditional on receiving remittances this average increases 
greatly to R1,281 (w1) / R1,165 (w3). This shows a clear skewing of the means towards the left by 
the large number of zero observations observed in the remittances variable and suggests OLS is 
not a good estimator in this situation. The low R-squared numbers for all regressions support this.  
Table 3: Regression results from cross-section waves (OLS) 
  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No. of pensioners in HH -63.18  -48.47***  -49.84**  
 (40.08)  (18.05)  (20.55)  
Age6064fhh  -100.1*  -33.35  -66.15** 
  (57.44)  (28.82)  (26.41) 
Age6569fhh  -86.11  -59.76**  -86.96*** 
  (71.61)  (26.32)  (28.14) 
Age70upfhh  -176.1**  -38.85  -29.63 
  (79.45)  (31.64)  (38.69) 
Age6064mhh  -31.47  -90.21***  -42.48 
  (57.36)  (27.47)  (43.39) 
Age6569mhh  -109.5  -79.05***  -47.57 
  (74.24)  (25.21)  (38.01) 
Age70upmhh  -1.159  -74.69***  -22.72 
  (107.4)  (26.92)  (45.89) 
Household size -126.6** -122.8** -31.54* -30.15 -55.13** -57.51** 
 (54.57) (54.86) (18.24) (18.58) (27.49) (27.58) 
Number of children <=16 in 
household 38.22** 37.66** 13.75* 13.38* 22.86*** 23.99*** 
 (15.19) (15.38) (7.074) (7.162) (8.538) (8.456) 
Constant -2,075*** -2,073*** -731.6*** -753.7*** -926.8*** -959.9*** 
 (464.1) (460.7) (222.0) (231.3) (177.8) (190.4) 
Observations 2,622 2,622 2,788 2,788 3,140 3,140 
R-squared 0.075 0.077 0.021 0.023 0.036 0.037 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample is limited to African households in which 
at least one adult is over the age of 50. Dependent variable in all regressions is ‘total remittances received by household’. Controls not shown: urban, 
head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, log of household income, province dummies. Income and remittance variables are deflated. Age 





Table 4 on the following page presents results of the same regression models as above but 
using a negative binomial estimator from the Generalised Linear Models (GLM) family. This 
estimator follows a Poisson distribution but includes a random effect (𝛼) that makes it able to 
account for overdispersion of the dependent variable; in the case here, this makes it more sensitive 
to the number of zero observations and consequent lower means in the data. An 𝛼 of zero 
indicates no overdispersion in the data. To test this, I assess likelihood ratio tests of 𝛼 in all 
regressions and confirm the presence of overdispersion in the dependent variable, implying a 
negative binomial regression is preferred to a Poisson regression.22  
Regression coefficients presented are calculated marginally at the average. Results are seen 
to be generally more significant than the previous OLS regressions, suggesting a better model fit. 
Evaluating the coefficient on the variable representing the number of pension age-eligible 
members in the household in column (1), (3) and (5) at their sample averages, indicates a reduction 
in remittances for each pensioner in the household of around 34% in wave 1, 26% in wave 2, and 
29% in wave 3.23 These results broadly support those found earlier. The coefficients in columns 
(2), (4) and (6) from regression designs using age groupings around the age-cutoff are negative for 
both females and males and generally significant. An interesting point to note is the relatively small 
coefficient and lack of significance for men aged 60-64 in wave 1, but which is larger and significant 
in waves 2 and 3. Further, the coefficient for men aged 65-69 in wave 1 is significant and far larger 
in magnitude. Taken together these suggest that the lowering of the pension eligibility age for men 
that took place between the waves had a significant effect on pension uptake for younger men 
which, in turn, had a shifting impact on remittances over time.  
  
                                                     
22 In each case for 𝛼, Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 which rejects the null hypothesis that 𝛼 is equal to zero 
23 Wave 1 mean: 0.617; wave 2 mean = 0.618; wave 3 mean = 0.615. 
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Table 4: Regression results from cross-section waves (Negative Binomial) 
  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No. of pensioners in HH -0.548***  -0.416***  -0.478***  
 (0.138)  (0.159)  (0.107)  
Age6064fhh  -0.473**  -0.129  -0.444** 
  (0.205)  (0.253)  (0.177) 
Age6569fhh  -0.545**  -0.391  -0.732*** 
  (0.223)  (0.309)  (0.216) 
Age70upfhh  -0.722***  -0.773**  -0.503** 
  (0.224)  (0.340)  (0.199) 
Age6064mhh  -0.107  -1.377***  -0.664*** 
  (0.291)  (0.408)  (0.227) 
Age6569mhh  -0.778**  -0.711**  -0.501* 
  (0.335)  (0.340)  (0.263) 
Age70upmhh  -0.669***  -0.731**  -0.391* 
  (0.236)  (0.315)  (0.228) 
Household size -0.0385 -0.0245 -0.684*** -0.693*** -0.389** -0.482*** 
 (0.212) (0.213) (0.222) (0.234) (0.165) (0.167) 
Number of children <=16 
in household 
0.148** 0.146** 0.131** 0.171** 0.162*** 0.173*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0595) (0.0655) (0.0675) (0.0494) (0.0499) 
Constant -5.801*** -5.707*** -3.850*** -3.730*** -3.373*** -3.785*** 
 (0.893) (0.893) (1.327) (1.347) (1.006) (1.025) 
ln(alpha) 3.832*** 3.831*** 4.545*** 4.538*** 3.994*** 3.992*** 
 (0.0528) (0.0528) (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.0503) (0.0503) 
Observations 2,622 2,622 2,788 2,788 3,140 3,140 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample is limited to African households in which 
at least one adult is over the age of 50. Dependent variable in all regressions is ‘total remittances received by household’. Controls not shown: urban, 
head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, log of household income, province dummies. 
5.2 Panel Analysis using Pooled Data 
Table 5 shows regressions on the untransformed dependent variable indicating the level 
of remittances received by an individual in the pooled panel data. Columns (1) and (2) represent 
pooled OLS and 2SLS which, while likely biased, provide an intuitive understanding of the model. 
Columns (3) and (4) present regressions using, respectively, fixed and random effects, and column 
(5) introduces non-remittance household income into the model. Column (6) provides a 
discontinuity design using age-eligibility groups (as opposed to a single eligibility indicator) for 
females and males respectively. Column (7) replicates the regression in column (6) using a Tobit 
estimator in an attempt to account for distributional issues in the dependent variable which is 
skewed towards zero. Importantly, all indicators of pension receipt or eligibility show a reduction 
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in the average level of remittances received, holding all else equal. These results are significant and 
relatively consistent across the different regression models. 
Table 5: Regression results using panel data, untransformed dependent variable 















Pension receipt -48.39*** -69.52*** -127.3*** -72.81*** -67.90***   
 (9.799) (14.19) (45.85) (14.08) (14.14)   
Age6064f      -31.94** -25.16* 
      (15.02) (14.43) 
Age6569f      -41.25** -40.28** 
      (17.24) (16.31) 
Age70upf      -46.09*** -44.24*** 
      (15.57) (14.44) 
Age6064m      -53.45*** -58.88*** 
      (18.90) (18.12) 
Age6569m      -64.13*** -62.81*** 
      (22.55) (21.33) 
Age70upm      -72.39*** -69.92*** 
      (21.05) (19.21) 
Indicator(other 
pensioner in HH) 
3.901 4.397 28.07 5.929 11.11 6.229 3.549 
 (9.369) (9.415) (21.60) (10.42) (10.45) (11.18) (10.41) 
Indicator(male) -69.84*** -71.81***  -72.71*** -69.17***   
 (7.382) (7.606)  (9.577) (9.592)   
Household size -14.05*** -14.23*** -10.29* -14.28*** -9.097*** -8.185*** -8.268*** 
 (2.678) (2.684) (5.292) (2.802) (2.954) (3.061) (2.882) 
Number of children 
<=16 in household 
20.47*** 20.96*** 19.62** 21.13*** 16.79*** 16.54*** 16.35*** 
 (4.468) (4.480) (8.060) (4.490) (4.555) (4.722) (4.445) 
Log(non-remittance 
income) 
    -30.78*** -35.26*** -34.13*** 
     (5.584) (5.661) (5.480) 
Constant 160.8*** 168.6*** 347.9* 162.8*** 371.3*** 381.3*** 382.6*** 
 (43.42) (43.67) (202.7) (43.65) (57.52) (59.63) (56.81) 
Observations 8,966 8,966 8,966 8,966 8,966 8,975 8,975 
R-squared 0.017 0.017      
Individual RE    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE   Yes     
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the household level in columns (1) and 
(2). The sample is limited to African individuals who are aged 50 or older. Dependent variable in all regressions is ‘remittances received by individual’. 
Controls not shown: urban, head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, province dummies, panel wave dummies. Panel used in regression is 
balanced with 2, 989 unique individuals in each wave. Instrument used for reported pension receipt in 2SLS regressions is an indicator equal to 1 
if individual is of a pension-eligible age. Age group indicators can be interpreted as with the following example: Age6064f is an indicator equal to 1 
if an adult respondent is female and is aged between or equal to 60 and 64 years, and 0 otherwise. 
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Column (1) uses actual reported pension receipt as the identifying variable and shows that 
reported receipt of the pension is associated with a reduction in remittances received. Column (2) 
instruments for reported pension receipt with a pension age-eligibility indicator (being of a 
pension-eligible age), which shows a small increase in the magnitude of the previous finding. These 
regressions are for comparative purposes only; given the potential endogeneity concerns in the use 
of reported remittance receipt discussed earlier, I use age-eligibility as an instrument for reported 
pension receipt in all the regressions that follow. Columns (3) and (4) attempt to control for bias 
due to the pooling of observations across waves which may result in correlation across time. 
Column (3) presents a regression including individual fixed effects, which shows a marked increase 
in the magnitude of remittance reduction associated with pension receipt. The regression in 
column (4) includes individual random – rather than fixed – effects, resulting in a similar coefficient 
to that of the pooled regression in column (2). This indicates two things. Firstly, it is understood 
that fixed effects are likely to more efficient than random effects if unobservable characteristics 
are correlated with the variable of interest. Given the exogeneity of the age-eligibility indicator, this 
is not likely to be the case here, rendering fixed effects less efficient than random effects. Further, 
the ratio of number of observations to waves is large, which doesn’t allow for much variation when 
using fixed effects but which comes at the expense of additional degrees of freedom. I run a 
standard Hausman test which confirms that random effects are preferred to fixed effects.24 Overall, 
fixed effects may also not be appropriate given estimation strategy design. Using observations of 
the same respondents over time will result in strong collinearity between their responses. In this 
case, fixed effects would pick up only minor variations in the data (e.g. due to date of interview). 
This again supports the use of random effects to control for variation over time going forward. 
Secondly, the similarity between the pooled regression and the regression that includes 
random effects suggests that serial correlation isn’t a real concern. Nonetheless, I use random 
effects in all regressions that follow given potentially unobserved influences in the error.25 The 
negative coefficients found on the constant term – implying impossible negative remittance receipt 
– have also disappeared in the individual level analysis.  
Pension receipt is associated with an average reduction of approximately R73 in the average 
level of remittances received, a result slightly larger than those found in the cross-sectional 
                                                     
24 I test the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients estimated on separate regressions using fixed and 
random effects, respectively, is not systematic. A chi-squared test results in a Prob>chi2 = 0.0003, implying that the 
use of fixed effects can be rejected in favour of random effects.   
25 Further, given the sample size here the asymptotic properties of estimates using random effects are likely to hold, 
implying robustness in the model 
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regression analysis. Column (5) introduces the log of non-remittance household income into the 
model. While endogeneity concerns would prefer the use of an instrument, I do not have adequate 
instruments for non-remittance household income. Nonetheless, it’s insertion in the model does 
not markedly change the estimates of the other variable coefficients. Its coefficient broadly 
supports the theoretical underpinnings of the crowding out hypothesis being tested; namely that 
higher levels of income (and, hence, higher utility levels) are associated with lower levels of 
remittance receipt. Column (6) presents a sharp regression discontinuity design that includes 
smaller age groups above the discontinuity (noting that the sample is limited to those aged 50 or 
older). The variables of interest are those indicators for an individual aged 60-64; that is, aged just 
above the pension-eligible age threshold. The design also separates the age groups into those for 
females and those for males, to test the gender differential in the effects of crowding out suggested 
in the literature.26 The results again indicate significant reductions in remittances received by 
individuals who are eligible for the pension compared to those who are not. The results are smaller 
for women than for men. Pension receipt is associated with reductions in remittances received of 
between R32 – R46 for women and between R52 – R73 for men, and are smaller for younger than 
for older pensioners. Given the large number of zero observations in the dependent variable, 
column (7) presents a Tobit estimator of the same regression model in column (6). The results are 
similar and still significant, albeit of a slightly smaller magnitude.  
In turning to the other explanatory variables, the results appear consistent with findings in 
the literature and are robust across the different regressions. Men receive, on average, significantly 
smaller remittances than women. Larger households receive smaller remittances, likely due to 
having more working age people at home. This is consistent with the finding that more children 
in the household lead to increases in the average level of remittances received. This latter finding 
may also be a reason women just above the pension age threshold in columns (6) and (7) are more 
robust to remittance reduction than men, given our findings in the sample statistics earlier that 
women are likely to live in households with more children than are men. The results presented 
here appear robust across the different regression models and are similar in magnitude to the cross-
sectional regression results earlier. However, there are still considerable distributional issues in the 
data. The results above use the dependent remittance variable in its untransformed form. The large 
presence of zero observations and the non-normal distribution of the variable makes it less than 
ideal when using OLS estimation. 
                                                     
26 Note, while the regressions model the pension-eligible age threshold as 60 for both women and men, the results 
are robust to using an age-cutoff of 65 for men in wave 1 data. 
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Table 6 present OLS regressions on the two transformed variables (log ‘plus one’; IHS) 
which now follow a roughly normal distribution pattern while retaining the zero observations. 
Both variables can be interpreted here in the same manner as would a normal logged dependent 
variable. These regressions represent the core test of the hypothesis of a crowding out of private 
transfers by the receipt of the government pension. The robustness of these results – which 
support this hypothesis – are tested in other regressions that follow, using further transformations 
of the data and different econometric techniques.  
Columns (1) and (3) use 2SLS estimators on the respective transformed variables, again 
using an indicator of pension eligibility (being of a pension eligible age) as an instrument for 
reported pension receipt. Columns (2) and (4) present the sharp regression discontinuity design 
using age-groupings around the age cutoff, for men and women separately. The results are slightly 
larger when using the IHS variable but coefficients are otherwise similar in magnitude and sign for 
both variables. In columns (1) and (3), pension receipt is associate with a reduction in average 
remittances received of between 37-41%. These results are significant and are greater in magnitude 
to those seen thus far using the untransformed remittance variable. In columns (2) and (4), there 
is a significant decrease in remittances for both men and women above the pension-eligible age 
cutoff. Women who become eligible for the pension see a reduction in average remittances 
received of around 11-12% while the number is much larger for men at between 32-35%. The 
extent of this reduction increases for both genders the older people get and is higher at all ages for 




Table 6: Regression results using panel data, transformed dependent variable (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Log(r+1) Log(r+1) IHS(r) IHS(r) 
Indicator(eligible for pension) -0.373***  -0.411***  
 (0.0578)  (0.0637)  
Age6064f  -0.112*  -0.122* 
  (0.0638)  (0.0706) 
Age6569f  -0.230***  -0.253*** 
  (0.0656)  (0.0725) 
Age70upf  -0.251***  -0.276*** 
  (0.0569)  (0.0628) 
Age6064m  -0.318***  -0.351*** 
  (0.0533)  (0.0589) 
Age6569m  -0.418***  -0.463*** 
  (0.0561)  (0.0617) 
Age70upm  -0.432***  -0.477*** 
  (0.0576)  (0.0635) 
Indicator(other pensioner in 
HH) -0.0128 -0.0499 -0.0144 -0.0553 
 (0.0427) (0.0389) (0.0472) (0.0429) 
Indicator(male) -0.406***  -0.448***  
 (0.0395)  (0.0436)  
Household size -0.0931*** -0.0905*** -0.103*** -0.100*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0127) (0.0121) 
Number of children <=16 in 
household 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0218) 
Constant 1.214*** 1.113*** 1.344*** 1.233*** 
 (0.178) (0.233) (0.197) (0.257) 
Observations 8,966 8,975 8,966 8,975 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses (robust in columns 1 and 3). The sample is limited to African 
individuals who are aged 50 or older. Controls not shown: urban, head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, province dummies, panel wave 
dummies. Columns (1) and (3) present 2SLS regressions, where indicator of pension eligibility is used as instrument for reported pension receipt. 
All regressions include individual random effects.   
Table 7 columns (1) to (4) replicate the regression models in Table 6 but, instead of OLS, 
use a Tobit estimator to test the relationship between pension and remittance receipt. Column (5) 
further introduces non-remittance income into the model. The Tobit regression assumes a lower 
bound to the dependent variable (here, zero) and is therefore useful in dealing with the presence 
of a large number of zero observations in the data. Tobit partial effects at the average can be seen 
to be smaller in magnitude for the pension-eligibility indicator than when using OLS, suggesting a 
decrease in average remittances received of between 27-30%, all else equal. Results continue to 
show a larger decrease for men than for women, and larger reductions for older people relative to 
more recent pensioners. In general, both men and women appear to experience the effects of 
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crowding out, while women appear more robust to this effect. The coefficient on the indicator for 
having another pensioner in the household is small and insignificant. This is most likely due to the 
small number of multi-pensioner households in the sample. The coefficient on the ‘male’ variable 
is large and significant, suggesting that males receive on average up to 45% less remittances than 
women, ceteris paribus. Larger households experience significantly lower levels of remittance 
receipt, although this is more than offset should the household include more children. Overall, 
accounting for distributional issues in the original data using the two transformations here suggests 
a larger effect of crowding out and a wider, more differential impact between these effects on 
women and men. However, there is a concern that the large number of zero observations 
continues to bias results.  
Table 7: Regression results using panel data, transformed dependent variable (Tobit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Log(r+1) Log(r+1) IHS(r) IHS(r) IHS(r) 
Indicator(eligible for pension) -0.271***  -0.299***  -0.269*** 
 (0.0417)  (0.0461)  (0.0458) 
Age6064f  -0.102*  -0.111*  
  (0.0598)  (0.0660)  
Age6569f  -0.229***  -0.253***  
  (0.0680)  (0.0751)  
Age70upf  -0.254***  -0.280***  
  (0.0607)  (0.0671)  
Age6064m  -0.332***  -0.366***  
  (0.0752)  (0.0830)  
Age6569m  -0.418***  -0.463***  
  (0.0889)  (0.0982)  
Age70upm  -0.433***  -0.478***  
  (0.0814)  (0.0899)  
Indicator(other pensioner in HH) -0.0193 -0.0521 -0.0217 -0.0576 0.0222 
 (0.0423) (0.0436) (0.0467) (0.0481) (0.0465) 
Indicator(male) -0.415***  -0.458***  -0.427*** 
 (0.0392)  (0.0432)  (0.0430) 
Household size -0.0913*** -0.0914*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.0578*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0131) 
Number of children <=16 in 
household 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.137*** 0.140*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Log(non-remittance income)     -0.258*** 
     (0.0247) 
Constant 1.196*** 1.138*** 1.324*** 1.260*** 3.078*** 
 (0.177) (0.179) (0.195) (0.197) (0.256) 
Observations 8,975 8,975 8,975 8,975 8,975 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses. The sample is limited to African individuals who are aged 
50 or older. Controls not shown: urban, head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, province dummies, panel wave dummies. All regressions 




Table 8 presents the results of the strategy incorporating the hurdle model approach. The 
hurdle model uses a two-tier approach, estimating separately selection into positive remittance 
receipt and then the level of remittances received, conditional on it being positive. Columns (1) 
and (3) are Probit estimators on a dependent variable equal to zero if the level of remittances 
received by an individual is zero, and equal to one if it is positive. Columns (2) and (4) present 
truncated regressions on the transformed IHS variable, conditional on the first Probit regressions 
being positive. This latter aspect removes the set of zero remittance observations and assumes that 
the error terms in the truncated model have a truncated normal distribution; that is, the distribution 
has been scaled upward over the now restricted range. Regression results report marginal effects 
evaluated at sample means. The model is appropriate given the reasonably normal distribution of 
the positive values of the transformed remittance variables for values of remittances greater than 
zero (see Figure 4). Columns (3) and (4) present the same regression model as the first two columns 
except include a variable for the log of non-remittance income received by the household.  
The coefficients on the pension age-eligibility indicator are consistently negative and 
significant. Looking at the Probit models, pension age-eligibility is associated with a decrease in 
the probability of receiving remittances of roughly 30% marginally at the average, dropping slightly 
when controlling for the level of non-remittance income. The truncated regression estimates on 
the restricted sample show a negative and significant coefficient of between -0.18 and -0.21. This 
suggests a decrease of between 18-23% in average remittances received due to pension receipt. 
This result is smaller in magnitude that most found thus far, suggesting the large presence of zero 
observations in the data biases results downwards when not accounted for. It must be noted that 
the hurdle model could potentially suffer from selection bias; unobservable characteristics may be 
correlated with those individuals more likely to receive remittances than those who do not. An 
analysis of only those who receive remittances, even though probability adjusted from the Probit 
model run before, may therefore fail to account for this. Nonetheless, the results are consistent 
with those found in the different analyses presented thus far; namely, that the receipt of public 




Table 8: Regression results using panel data, Hurdle Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables IHS(r) IHS(r) IHS(r)  IHS(r) 
Indicator(eligible for 
pension) -0.297*** -0.178** -0.235*** -0.207** 
 (0.0462) (0.0791) (0.0466) (0.0823) 
Indicator(other 
pensioner in HH) -0.0745 -0.0253 -0.00460 -0.0448 
 (0.0567) (0.117) (0.0579) (0.117) 
Indicator(male) -0.695*** -0.238** -0.650*** -0.243** 
 (0.0573) (0.120) (0.0584) (0.119) 
Log(household size) -0.339*** 0.266*** -0.150*** 0.214** 
 (0.0510) (0.0999) (0.0536) (0.107) 
Number of children 
<=16 in household 0.0815*** -0.0214 0.0537*** -0.0120 
 (0.0169) (0.0334) (0.0174) (0.0344) 
Log(non-remittance 
income)   -0.290*** 0.0519 
   (0.0303) (0.0378) 
Constant -0.856*** 6.865*** 1.109*** 6.543*** 
 (0.0647) (0.116) (0.219) (0.267) 
Observations 8,986 8,986 8,982 8,982 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the household level. The sample is limited to 
African individuals who are aged 50 or older. Controls not shown: panel wave dummies. Columns (1) and (3) are Probits. Columns (2) and (4) are 
truncated normal regressions on those finding positive remittance receipt in the Probits.  
5.3 Robustness Checks 
A number of empirical issues require investigation given their potential impact on the unbiasedness 
of results. Based on evidence from the literature, I explore certain behavioural changes in the 
household that may be linked to pension receipt. Table 9 presents the same RDD strategy, but 
this time testing co-residence patterns and employment in the household.  
Columns (1) and (2) present results from a regression with household size as the dependent 
variable. As per Jensen (2003), it may be that non-resident family members hope to access some 
share of the increase in household income by moving in with relatives that become eligible for the 
pension. Klasen & Woolard (2008) find that access to the OPG provides an important safety net 
in households, which increase in size upon pension receipt as unemployed members move in. 
Ardington et al. (2009) support this through findings that unemployed resident individuals are 
drawn to households eligible for the OPG. Alternatively, increased income in the household may 
free those who were remaining at home to care for the elderly to leave and begin their own 
households. Results here suggest that neither of these hypotheses is the case here. The coefficients 
on the eligibility indicators are small and insignificant. Pension receipt for all eligible individuals 
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and, more specifically, for men and women aged above the eligibility threshold does not seem to 
be associated with significant changes in the size of the household.  
Changes in co-residence patterns may be less to do with the number of people in the 
household than with shifts in the type of members living there. Grandparents play an important 
family support role in raising children and it may be that households with elderly members who 
become eligible for the pension see a shift of more children into the household as families take 
advantage of the increase in income. Column (2) runs a regression using as a dependent variable 
the fraction of household members younger than 16. Coefficients on the eligibility indicators are 
positive and significant, suggesting that the receipt of the pension is associated with a shift towards 
having more children in the household. This finding is, however, limited to women pensioners 
aged just above the cutoff and is very small; pension receipt by women sees a rise in the proportion 
of children in the household by just over 2%.  
Another potentially important household response involves changes in employment within 
the household. Members of a household (other than a pensioner) may work less with the increase 
in income due to demand for more leisure time. Bertrand et al. (2003) find reductions in labour 
participation in South Africa and decreases in the working hours of prime-aged individuals when 
household members become eligible for the OPG. Alternatively, the increase in income may allow 
those who were staying at home to care for the elderly the opportunity to seek employment. I use 
reported employment by adults in the household to generate an employment indicator equal to 1 
if the household has member that earns a wage through employment, and zero if not. To counter 
the obvious change that a pensioner her/himself stops working upon receipt of the pension, I also 
control for individual employment status in the regression. The coefficients are negative and 
significant, with results suggesting that receipt of the pension is associated with a decrease in 
probability of employment in the household of just under 5%. This result appears limited to 
women and not men and is relatively small. Overall, while there is some evidence of shifting 
household behaviour in response to pension receipt, these results appear to be too small to explain 





Table 9: Robustness tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables HHsize  HHsize Child16frac Child16frac   HH employ  HH employ  
Pension receipt 0.0670  0.0244***  -0.0482***  
 (0.110)  (0.00888)  (0.00745)  
Age6064f  0.0516  0.0226***  -0.0392*** 
  (0.0862)  (0.00755)  (0.00661) 
Age6569f  -0.151  0.0232**  -0.0429*** 
  (0.112)  (0.00948)  (0.00794) 
Age70upf  -0.152  0.00183  -0.0331*** 
  (0.121)  (0.00975)  (0.00784) 
Age6064m  0.0272  -0.00307  0.00262 
  (0.112)  (0.00980)  (0.00867) 
Age6569m  0.0755  0.00393  -0.00551 
  (0.152)  (0.0128)  (0.0106) 
Age70upm  0.637***  0.0209  -0.0314*** 
  (0.174)  (0.0140)  (0.0108) 
Constant -0.897** -0.865** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.0206 0.0167 
 (0.381) (0.382) (0.0317) (0.0318) (0.0219) (0.0221) 
Observations 8,966 8,975 8,966 8,975 8,253 8,261 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in brackets. The sample is limited to African individuals who are aged 50 
or older. Controls not shown: Columns (1)-(6): male indicator, HH head’s age, HH head’s age-squared, HH head’s education, urban indicator, 
province dummies, and panel wave dummies. Columns (1)-(4) also include log of non-remittance household income. Columns (5) and (6) also 
include household size, number of children younger than 16, presence of another pensioner in the household, and individual employment status. 
Regressions in columns (1), (3), and (5) use 2SLS, with age eligibility instrumenting for reported pension receipt. All regressions contain individual 





6. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to test the relationship between public and private transfers to households and 
individuals in South Africa. Evidence in many developing countries points to a ‘crowding out’ 
effect, whereby receipt of public transfers displaces private transfers received by households. This 
can be explained by an altruistic-driven hypothesis of intra-household resource allocation, where 
household members take the wellbeing of other members into account in their own utility 
functions. This hypothesis is the one I test in this paper in a South African context. South Africa 
provides an interesting case study for two reasons: firstly, the country has a large public cash grant 
system that reaches over a third of the population and has grown in its share of poorer households’ 
income; secondly, a history of racial discrimination manifested through geographical displacement 
has resulted in a labour system strongly reliant on economic migrants who oscillate between 
predominantly rural homes and urban workspaces. Hence, in this paper I test the relationship 
between the relatively generous state pension and private remittances received by households. I 
do this using pension age-eligibility to instrument for reported pension receipt and constructing a 
discontinuity design around the pension eligible age threshold. Data used draws on three waves of 
national-level panel data in South Africa. Visual depictions of the data show a general drop off in 
remittances received around the age-eligibility threshold for both men and women. 
Results are relatively robust across the different strategies I use. Pension receipt is 
associated with a 20-30% reduction in the average level of remittances received by individuals, 
ceteris paribus. This finding is consistent, although less significantly so, at the household level. The 
magnitude of results are strongly influenced by the large presence of zero observations in the 
variable indicating level of remittances received, which is also not normally distributed. Not 
accounting for these concerns appears to bias results downwards, with larger coefficients (of up 
to a 40% reduction in remittances) obtained than when I use transformed variables and more 
appropriate Tobit estimators and a hurdle model. Remittances, like other forms of income, are 
heavily reliant on the behaviour of individuals under observation. Likewise, remittances transfers 
rely on the behaviour of the economic migrants from which they arrive. While I find only small 
changes in household behaviour related to pension receipt, due to data limitations I am not able 
to scrutinise and control for migrant characteristics in my analysis. Further work in better 
understanding the situation of economic migrants in relation to this data would therefore be useful.  
There are two primary policy implications from my findings, both in South Africa and more 
generally. The first relates to targeting of the state pension program. Cash grants are targeted at 
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vulnerable sections of the population, including the disabled, children, and the elderly. The 
presence of crowding out implies that a proportion of the income increase from the pension 
accrues to migrants, who retain a greater proportion of remittances, and not to pensioners 
themselves who experience a corresponding remittance reduction. Put simply, pensioners are not 
as well off as they might have been given the increase in income due to a corresponding decrease 
in income from other sources. Conversely, the effect of this is a wider reaching impact by the state 
pension than on the elderly and their co-residents alone. The multiplier effects in the economy of 
this cash grant will likely be higher by putting money into the pockets of those who are 
economically active.27  
The second policy implication relates to evidence on the effectiveness of the pension program. 
As outlined in the review section, a large body of research points to the positive developmental 
impact the OPG has on both the elderly and the people with whom they live (children in 
particular). Failing to take into account the corresponding decrease in remittances linked to 
pension receipt means that the socio-economic ‘return’ per Rand of the pension is likely 
understated in most analyses; that is, the benefits from pension seen are being generated from a 
smaller increase in income than the pension-amount taken at face value. The pension program 
may therefore be a more powerful means of addressing income and other types of poverty than 
previously thought. Future work in understanding the shifts that take place within households that 
receive the pension must be cognisant of this. Understanding the intra-household allocation of 
resources by taking the situation of migrant members into account may also have important lessons 
for policymakers, including in relation to bargaining within the household.   
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APPENDIX 1: RESULTS USING UNBALANCED PANEL 
Table 10: Regression results using unbalanced panel data, untransformed dependent 
variable 















Pension receipt -44.63*** -62.19*** -107.8** -63.43*** -57.96***   
 (8.346) (12.09) (44.91) (12.04) (12.10)   
Age6064f      -25.79** -23.39* 
      (13.08) (12.85) 
Age6569f      -29.56** -29.41** 
      (14.74) (14.39) 
Age70upf      -32.07** -32.17*** 
      (12.76) (12.37) 
Age6064m      -56.95*** -59.01*** 
      (15.84) (15.54) 
Age6569m      -54.68*** -54.54*** 
      (18.85) (18.41) 
Age70upm      -65.16*** -64.51*** 
      (16.90) (16.31) 
Indicator(other 
pensioner in HH) 3.794 4.162 27.23 5.251 10.95 6.787 5.473 
 (8.380) (8.394) (20.66) (8.785) (8.812) (9.196) (8.927) 
Indicator(male) -69.04*** -70.83***  -71.19*** -68.33***   
 (6.340) (6.538)  (8.081) (8.083)   
Household size -13.71*** -13.83*** -9.260* -13.76*** -8.865*** -8.280*** -8.369*** 
 (2.327) (2.330) (5.055) (2.385) (2.504) (2.544) (2.481) 
Number of children 
<=16 in household 21.42*** 21.77*** 17.69** 21.76*** 17.58*** 17.59*** 17.58*** 
 (3.854) (3.857) (7.706) (3.861) (3.912) (3.974) (3.873) 
Log(non-remittance 
income)     -30.99*** -34.59*** -34.14*** 
     (4.885) (4.900) (4.830) 
Constant 121.8*** 128.8*** 335.0* 124.9*** 338.8*** 343.2*** 343.8*** 
 (35.83) (36.13) (201.9) (38.03) (50.59) (51.55) (50.49) 
Observations 11,120 11,120 11,120 11,120 11,120 11,131 11,131 
R-squared 0.016 0.016      
Individual RE    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE     Yes         
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered at the household level in columns (1) and 
(2). The sample is limited to African individuals who are aged 50 or older. Dependent variable in all regressions is ‘remittances received by individual’. 
Controls not shown: urban, head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, province dummies, panel wave dummies. Instrument used for reported 
pension receipt in 2SLS regressions is an indicator equal to 1 if individual is of a pension-eligible age. Age group indicators can be interpreted as 
with the following example: Age6064f is an indicator equal to 1 if an adult respondent is female and is aged between or equal to 60 and 64 years, 




Table 11: Regression results using unbalanced panel data, transformed dependent 
variable (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Log(r+1) Log(r+1) IHS(r) IHS(r) 
Indicator(eligible for pension) -0.373***  -0.412***  
 (0.0499)  (0.0550)  
Age6064f  -0.109*  -0.119* 
  (0.0569)  (0.0629) 
Age6569f  -0.224***  -0.248*** 
  (0.0579)  (0.0639) 
Age70upf  -0.236***  -0.260*** 
  (0.0476)  (0.0525) 
Age6064m  -0.332***  -0.366*** 
  (0.0435)  (0.0482) 
Age6569m  -0.390***  -0.432*** 
  (0.0510)  (0.0561) 
Age70upm  -0.420***  -0.464*** 
  (0.0490)  (0.0541) 
Indicator(other pensioner in 
HH) -0.00776 -0.0429 -0.00878 -0.0475 
 (0.0363) (0.0327) (0.0401) (0.0361) 
Indicator(male) -0.408***  -0.450***  
 (0.0337)  (0.0372)  
Household size -0.0944*** -0.0934*** -0.104*** -0.103*** 
 (0.00985) (0.00942) (0.0109) (0.0104) 
Number of children <=16 in 
household 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0176) (0.0188) 
Constant 0.992*** 0.885*** 1.099*** 0.982*** 
 (0.157) (0.192) (0.173) (0.211) 
Observations 11,120 11,131 11,120 11,131 
Significance defined as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in parentheses (robust in columns 1 and 3). The sample is limited to African 
individuals who are aged 50 or older. Controls not shown: urban, head’s age, head’s age-squared, head’s education, province dummies, panel wave 
dummies. Columns (1) and (3) present 2SLS regressions, where indicator of pension eligibility is used as instrument for reported pension receipt. 
All regressions include individual random effects.   
 
 
 
 
